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I.

TIB CIMGTS

It is alleged under Count I of the Indictr.iont tliat the defendant
conifaitted Criiaos against Peace in that he participated in the

initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in
violation'of international laws and treaties^ including but not liexlted

to. the planning^ preparation, initiation and waging of vfars of aggression,
and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and
assurances. The acts recognized as Crir.ios against Peace arc sot forth in
ij:ticlG II of Control Council law No.- 10.

'fOURl'IiJIN is charged under Count II of the Indictment with partici

pation during a period of years preceding 8 May 19h$j

leader,

organizer, instigator and accomplice in the fon.iulation and execution of

a con.ion plan and conspiracy to coo-iit, and which involved the comi.iission

of Criiaos against Poaco ( including the acts constituting "".far Crir.ies
and Crimes a^^inst Hui.ianity. which were comr.iitted as an integral part of

such Criiaos against Peace) as defined by Control Council lav/ Mo. 10,
and is individually responsible for his own acts and for all acts
coimiitted by any persons in tho oxccution of such comiion plan and

conspiracy = The proof adduced relcitivc to Counts I, III, V, VI.and VII

forms a part o.f the said connon plan and conspiracy, and such proof is
incorporated in Count II for the substantiation of the allegations
in Count II.

".'OEId'WlN is charged under Count III of tho Indictiucnt with tho

cordjaisslon of v/ar crii.ios in that ho participated during the period from
September 1939 to Iby 19US in atrocities and offenses against prisoners
of war and members of the armed forces of nabioiis then at war with tho

Third Reich or under the bcniigoront control of, or military occupation
by Genaany, includin^j murder, ill treatment, onslaveKient, brutalities;
cruelties and other inhumane acts, itho acts recognized as war crimes are
sot forth in ijcticlo IX of Control Council Law No, 10,
Tl03RI-.4ii.NN is charged under Count V of the Indictment with the comju-

ission of Mar Grir.ies and Crimes against Hur.ianity as defined in /a:'ticlc II
of Control Council law Noc 10 in that he participated in a.trocitios and
- 3 -
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offenses, inolnding murder, exbenainat-ion, enslavement, deportation,im
prisonment, killing of hostages, torture, persecutions on political,
racial and religious grounds and other inhumane and criminal acts

against Geyroan nationals and i.ienibers of the civilian populations of

countries and territories under the belligoront occupation of, or other

wise controlled by Germany, plunder of public and private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, and devastation not
justified by r.ii.litary necessity.
Under Count VI of the Indictiaent, 1T0ER!It^M is charged Yd.th the
Commission of 'Var Griracs and Crimes against Huiiianity as defined in
ij?ticlo II of Control Council law No, 10 in that he participated in the

plunder, of public and private property, exploitation, spoliation and
other offenses against property and the civilian ocononios of countries
>v

and territories v/hich came under the belligerent occupation of Gcrr.iany
in the course of its invasions and aggressive wars.

Under Count VII of-the Indictoent,

is charged with the

.'GPmiiission of liar Criaes c^nd Criiaos against Hui.ianity as defined in iiTticle
II of Control Council law No, 10 in that he participated in the onslavo-

ncnt and deportation to slave labor on a gigantic scale of merAbers of the
civilian population of countries and territories under the belligerent

occupation of or othcrrriso controlled by-the Third Reichj onslavcnont of
concentration camp inr.iates including Gorman nationals; the use of

prisoners of war in war operations and v/ork having a'.direct relation tP
war operations; and the iiltrcatr;oiit, terrorization, torture and murder
of enslaved persons. Including prisoners of war.

Under Count VIII of the Indictment,

is charged with

membership, subsequent to 1 September 1939, in Die Schutsstaffoln der
Natlonalsoziaiistischon Doutschen i*rbeiterpartoi (commonly known as the

"33" ) declared to be criminal by the liiternational j)ti.litary Tribunal
and paragraph 1 (d) of Article II of Control Council Law No, lo.

- 4 -
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II. Biographical Data

The defendant Ernst VfOSRIMIN "vras born as son of the Director cf

the Dresden i^rt Gallery on 30 I'iarch 1888 in Dresden,He studied lav/,
passed his legal examinations and graduated as a Doctor of lav/ before

the First iiorld V/ar(•br.p.lOBUU). He served frora 19lU till 1918 in the

First Tforld War and v/as discharged as a First Lieutenant (tr.p.lOSUU^
Exh, 2^63, Doc.Book 9U p.121). In February 1919 he entered the Gerroan
Foreign Office. i*fter some preliriiinary training he v/orked till fall

1919 in the nev/ly created "Peace Departiaent" (tr.p.lOBUU/^, 3xh.

Doc.Book.l p.29). Frora January 1920 until 1923, WOERIl^NI'I v/orked in
Paris, first as raeraber of the German Peace Delegation, after its

dissolution in 1921, as Legation Secretary in the German Ej.ibassy

(tTop.lOBU^, Exh,7 ibid.) Frora 1923 until 1925, he v/as economic
and political referent for France in the Foreign Office. ..bout half
of this period he spent in Paris on Gerroan-Fronch Trade Pact nego-

tiations (tr,p^l08l|.6), Frora 1925 till 1929, he roainly v/orked on
Gconoroic matters, as Legation Councillor at the Gerraan Legation in

Vienna (tr.pol08I|.6, Exh.7 ibid.) In 1929, he joined the Ecconomic
Division of the Foreign C^fice; in this position he attended the
roajority of the international reparations conferences (ibid.) In

1930, he was Gerraan Consul at Liege, Belgium (Sxh^7, ibid.)
In 1931, he entered the Legal Division of the Foreign Office,

in which he stayed for five years. In 1932, he was promoted Legation
Councillor First Class, in 193U Senior Councillor of Legation (tr.p.

IO8U6/7, Kxh,7 ibid.;, in the sarae year, hp became Chief of the
Section "International Law" of the Legal Division.
^ 1936, he entered the Political Division as Chief of it&.

European Group with the rank of iHnister First Class, i.3 such ho was

one of the two "Dirigents" (Deputy Directors) of the Political

Division (E3di,7 ibid., tr.pp.10867, llOU?). In October 1936 he v/as
transferred to the ^erman Embassy in London as Erabassy Councillor

(tr,p.l08U8, Sxh.7 ibid.). It was the nev/ly appointed Chief of the
London miabassy, Joaohira von Hibbentrop, who asked that WOERIt.tJH bo
assigned to him (tr.p.10868, a^ffidavit Vogol, 70ERHi.NN Exh, 12,
-5-
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UOKRIiiJ^N DoCoBook 3 Pi,13a). V/hilo Ribbentrop v^as away at least half
of the tiue, TfO'niRIfiii.NN was in charge of the London Erabassy as Charge^

dhJ^faircs (trop.lOBUS)»
In ifcpril 1938^ VfOERiiilTN reached the top of his career by his
appointment as ilinistorial Director and Chiof of the Political Division
of the Foreign Office in Berlin with the title of Undersecretary of

State (Sxh.7 ibid.)» i^gain it was Ribbentrop, who had personally picked
him for tliis key position (tr»p. 10673). V/OEEUkJIN remained in London as
Charge dU-^fairos until the end of i».pril to await the arrival of his

successor Theodor Kordt (tr.10872/3).
ITOERlltJ'IN remained in charge of the Political Division during the

decisive years until upril 19U3> when he was appointed German
ijabassador in Nanking (tr,pp,108U8, 108^1, Exh,7 ibid,). He stayed
^

in Nanking till the end of the War, ^JCter the '-'ar he was tried before

an ij-aerican Military Court on a charge of ordering or permitting

military support of Japan after 8 May 19U5^ but was acquitted

(tr,pa08Sl/2),

%
%

^
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III,Character and political attitude.

The defendant ''.'iC.IPJ.'AM joined the Nazi Pr.rty in October 1937

(tr,p.l0859) . In 1938 he became a member of the SS (Hi>ch,7jOoc.Book I
p.29).Though a convinced Kationalist^he only adopted National
Socialism with certain inner reservations, and the Prosecution finds
no fault w i t h s own description of his attitude bo National
Socialism:

"Q, So you joined the Party.Did that make you a convinced
Nasi?

A. No. Sometimes I tried ver;>'" hard to become one, but I

didn't succeed."

(tr.p.lOS59)»

I'TOjHUAANNj asformer Chief of the Section "International Law" of
the Legal Division of the Foreign Office, is ^an expert on Inter
national Law.This must be borne in mind when judging the violations
of internation-"'! law and international agreements in which he

participated.
D'OSHI-.ANIJ was a career civil servant in the Foreign Office.
He owed his brilliant career to his excellent professional

qualifications and the fact that Ribbentrop appreciated them,

which is proved by "OiilR>ANN's own statement that Ribbentrop asked
for his assignment as Chargi d'Affaires of the London Imbassy

(tr.o.lOd^S) and later personally selected him as Chief of the
Political Divison (tr.p.l0873). VJOSRfiANN does not claim to have
1

participated in any resistance movement. Nor does he claim to
have known anything of the alleged resistance activities of his
chief von A'eizsaecker. All he did was to criticize National

Socialism in private circle as nearly everyone now claims to

have done, (Affidavit Reinhold, WimiAMN Ilxh,30j Doc.Book
3 p.67a). The prosecution is willing to believe that
s conscience and inner conviction

occasionally revolted

against Nazi terror and brutality. But this highly educated and
gifted man remained in his high political position in the very
heart of the Forei,gn Office during the five decisive years of

Nazi foreign policy. He was willing to supp ort the policy of
- 7 -

T-g^rj^sion and to participate in Crimes against Peace, War Crimes

and Crimes a.gainst Humanity -with -which he is charged in the

Indictment. In spite of some inner reservations he faithfully served

his masters Hitler, Hibbentrop and Weizsaecker•Apart from his legal
guilt, v/hioh will be sho-vm in this and other briefs, he bearg the
which

moral gyiilt of the bad example/h^ gave to his subordinated in the
Political Division and to other officials in the Foreign Office

among whom he enjoyed a high prestige, by his staying in Office, his
participation in Nazi foreign policy and his acceptance of a high rank
in the blood-soiled SS«

%
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IV. Rosponsibility as Chief of the Political Division.

The dofondani v70ERlI*NlI, in his direct tostiraony, described the
acopo of his responsibility as Chief of the Political Division
as follows}

1\ "Naturally I consider myself responsible for everything
that I signed or did in any other capacity when I was
Head of the Political Division"... •

2) I also did and do consider myself responsible for what
happened in the Political Diviion, of v^hich I was Head,
oven when I did not approve or did not know the

individual case." (tr.p,11063).

He then gives tv^o exceptions where, in his opinion his

respor .sibility was excluded, namely

a) special assignments, given by Ribbentrop to officials of
the Political Division, specifica3Jy excluding the use of official

cha- uiels (tr,p,11063/14-),

'

b) periods of leave or official absence (tr.p.ll06$).
ty

This definition of WOERE:JIN»s responsibij/seems to bo fair

aiid in general acceptable, though,as ho himself indicates(tr.p»

Il063/l4.)it may bo difficult to establish in some specific cases,
whether or not a special assignment given by Ribbontrop excluded
the use of official channels.

VOiHRJliiNN further correctly states that the Political Division

was a "homogeneous community", v/hich worked according to his
directives (tr.p.llo6U).

" In view of the organization and the general opinion
the Division was the responsible working unit at least
in the Foreign Office. The Division Chief was responsible .

'

for it and not the Referent or the Dirigent." (tr.p,1106h/5) •
The defendant vfOEm5i*NN was further the deputy of the State

Secretary von Tfeizsaeckor, and thus assumed his full funstions and
responsibility whenever the latter was prevented through absence,

illness or similar reasons (Tfeizsaocker testimony tr#p«8%^i defense-'
witness Lolvaann on direct testimony tr,p.9636,i'ffidavit tocke,
TroEMfcNN-^hil9, V/OBRM.NN Doc.Book 3,Po37,

also Pros•Ii5xh,G-»3?0,

Doc .Book 206 p.11,where Ribbenti»op addresses Woerraann .officially
as "The ifcCting State SQepetary")^
-9-

The Political Division as a working unit was created in 1936

(tr»p,106l4-8) .Though it was tecluiically coordinated to the other
divisions (tr.p, 110U3),it v/as naturally, as the departuent dealing
with the iipolitical'i aspect

, the most important one, the very heart

and core of the Foreign Office, and this obviously vras the reason why
its chief was the deputy of the State Secretary.Tlie ProsGCution has
introduced a document ^vhich clearly defines the importance and
functions of the Political Division, This is 3xh.3658,Doc .Book 99-it.
p.T^a draft by ijabassador von Hintolon of 30 September 19Uii on the

structure of the Foreign Office and its various divisions. Section II
of this draft, v/hich vdll be quoted hereafter, deals with the Political

Division, and nobody was in a better position to describe its ir.iportanco and functions than von Rintelen

i/ho had served for sorac tirae

as Deputy Director of the Political Division under VfOFRlUTN(tr.p.

ll50^/6) and during this trial favored his forraer Chief VlOHU'IiJ^I with
several affidavits

UlN-Dxh, 15,5U,58, and 193).

'* Vfithin the Foreign Office the Political Division

holds the

position of a central agency which is to observe current
events abroad and to deterr.iinc foreign policy according to
the Fuehrer's intentions. For this purpose it is subdivided
into sections, responsible for the individual countries,

T/hich hr.VG the duty to provide the Reich Foreign llinister at
any tiiuo v/ith the most accurate information concerning the

foreign political situation of a specific country and which
must bo able to put the entire available material at his

disposal,Thus, for Gxamplo,in political decisions to bo
tfikcn in our relations to Spain, the Politict^l Division
oust be in the position to h£'.vc within iiumodiatc reach all
data giving cxliaustivo information on political develop
ment in Spain up to nov;, on her relations to us and to

other powers,c'.ud on her present dominant political trends.
This demands a constant collection and evaluation of general
and confidential information, v/hich is obtained by various

v/ays -.nd means, and also requires observing regularly the
attitude of politically ir.iportant personalities abroad,The

Political Division obtains the necessary data through
telegraphic, written and verbal reports of their foreign
missions, through reports from officials sent abroad
especially for this purpose, through infoiric-.tion derived
from confidential and secret sources| in addition through
the current use of press and radio information supplied by

the Press and Broadcasting Divisions,through studying
ir.iportant political docwaents, and finally through personal
contact Yrith accredited foreign missions in Berlin and

through the services of influential people abroad.
The second important function of the Political Division
consists in the political guidance of our foreign reprosentativos. It is the duty of this department to see that the
German missions abroad got sufficiently well acquainted with

the guiding principles of the Reich Foreign liinistor in
foreign policy as well as v;ith the political atmosphere in
-
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other countries• (Language groups).But it also providts the
necessary instructions for the Gcrnan laissions abr^ad^ v/ith
regard to all specific political questions, so that they are
dealt vri.th in complete conformity with the Heich Foreign
Ilinister's directives.

Finally^ the Political division must ix.intain contact

y\.,

-.irJ.

with foreign missions in Goruiany, i t must accept their
proposals ^;d.th regard to political questions, and it

negotiate these questions with thoi.i. '.'ithin the Foroij^h"

•

Office i t is the responsibility of the Political Division

¥4^

to see to i t tiiat the activities of other divisions confor:.i

with uur principles of foreign policy, g(3 norally ancTlin

^•a-.

evc'ry specific caso,sinoc it is Understood thfit such
specific questions, for ema'mple quoeticns relixting t©
foioign trade matters and the foreign press, can only be
dealt vnLth if thoy fall clearly in lino with tl'io general
political trend to which wo adhere vfith regard to foreign

countries." (Underscoring supplied, I]:di.3653, Doc'.Book
pp. 7 ).
The Defense has tried to' weaken the full impact of tills document by
/♦

introducing an affidavit of its author von Hintelen as T'/OF':iIU.BlI-^h,193,
.A

ir-

D^OERi'uJIN-DoCthook 9 p.32,
in

The affiant thero/ states that the purpose for vj-hioh riibbcntrop
s

comtiiissionod hin tlirough Gaus td^reparo the dScription of the
strusture of the Foreign Office was to prevent possible attempts

by Goebbels to dissolve or cut doivn in size certain specih^ic
divisions of the Foreign Office,Those specific divisions v/cro the

Press,Information, and Kadio Divisions, but not the Political
Division.Tfith no word does the affiant claim tluit anu-thing is wrong
in his description of the Political Division. In order

to save the

Press, Information and Hndio Divisions from Goobbcls 1 oncrcacb'.ionts,
he may liave stressed their iiapori^anco vrithin the whole structure of
the Foreign Office, If he did so, von Hintelen shifted the •reight,

m

vfithin the Foroig.n Office, not in favor, but at the Q:<pon8o of the

Political Division,that is in the opposite direction

of what the

%
'Vs I

DofensG tries to prove. Thus the affidavit of von itintclon is not

only useless fo'r the Defense, but oven, to a certain degree,
damaging.

• The fa#tt that Exti.363'8 dates from a tiiuo wlicn '/ODRIkJUT ix.d
already been replaced by •Undorsccrottiry of State Hencko as Chief of o .
the Pclitical Division is irrelevant since 7/ODIUU'lJ hii.iself claij.is
I

tliat the scope of the Political Division decreased during the Vfer

as a natural consoquonoc pf the olii.u,natlon of belligerent couil'tr,pollugo/l)

t^ics from the scope of its activities/ so tlvX tho iiaportanco and
-
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scope of the Political Division -was greater, not smaller under

l/TOSH&JIN than under his successor Hencko^ (Hencke himself, in his
Defense i^ffidavit for TfOERi'LlNN, states that the functions wero the

same under hir.i and VfOSRIMNi(W0SRI•1J^^^•I-Sxh.25,

•TOUHIIJIN Doc,Book 3 p,55)

One of the most important functions of the Political Division

"vvas the preparation of suggestions and advice to the Roich Foreign
Minister on the basis of the foreign political information which the
Political Division furnished,collected and kept up to dato,This

important function, though not mentioned in Dxh,36^3,has been a:.iply

discussed by the defendant HLmsclf (tr»p,11039/U0)and his affiant
and suc.cessor ,*ndor • Hencko, (vfoerwann nxh.25, vrocri.iann Doc.Book 3

p,U9/?0) .l/hilc

himself states that tliis task v/as massing
of

from his duties, because Ribbentrop told him in the fall/LP33 that
he did not -vvant ?-ny unsolicited advioe, his affiant Hencke states,

more cautiously, that this task was theoretically in existence,but
practically restricted, vro3Ril,NH actually did i:iake suggestions and
give advice in very ii.iportant natters of foreign policy,Tliis will

be proved by specific docuiaents in Section V of this Brief,

The Political Division,in addition,played a groat part in tho
fabrication of false propaganda vrhoro Ribbentrop tried to outdo

his rival Goebbols ,I3xh,390, Doc,Book 206 p.11, a tolegran from

Ribbentrop to TOBR'i,WN

of 2h July 19Ul, shov/s that "Ribbentrop.

G-vpected close cooporation from the Political Division in the

production of dcliboratc lies. From November I9I4I on the Political
Division submitted every Saturday regular propaganda suggestions

through Vfcizsaecker to Ribbentrop, after '.VOSRIUJIT had discuss od thorn
on Friday with his deputy von Erdoannsdorff and with von Schmiodon,

'JOEHllxNN in ah order of 11 November 19UI,circulated among all sections
of his

ivision , urged his Section Gliicfs to devote themselves to

those propaganda tasks " with especial resourcefulness, speed and care"
(Exh,3676,Doc .Book 99-^^ p.62). Some striking examples of u'OElluRIH's

propaganda activities have been introduced in Ibchibits 367h,3b75 and 3-.",
3676 (Doc.Book 99-i-i. P

For instances
-

12 ^

"It is suggested to disturb the relations between the
British Governriiont on one side and the Soviet Governiient

and British workers on the other side by broadcasting
intensive Bolshevist propaganda to England.

uxi illegal v/ireless transi-iitter should be set up by the
Broadcasting Department for this purpose ^.poriiaps in northern
France),
• B'or the supply of plausible oatorial suitable personali
ties from araong the prisoners of the Rod
for instance

the DCP functionary Shigunow) should be selected...."

(Bxh.3676, Suggestion 7/13^ Doc,Book 99-h p.66).
or

"Roosevelt has caused the Vfar with the intention in the

back of his mind of iniieriting England; Roosevelt incited
the v/holo world against England, the collapse of the
British Erapire is- Roosevelt's fault."

(ViOERliiMN's instructions for language to be used in

circular telegram of 31 Ijecembor 19Ul,Exh.3675jDoo,Buok
99-h p.60),

T/OERI\iJ'JN's position as Chief of the Political Division and as deputy

of the State Sechctary von '..bizsaccker may be sui'.ij-iarizcd,that it vras
a prominent one, including a substantial amount of discretionary

functions. Ho clutLrly falls VJithin the criteria of criminalty as sot

forth in defining culpability for Crimes against Peace in par.2 of

ij:"ticle II of Control Council Invf j/10, since ho hold "a high political
position in Gerr.iany".

•

'• •:«''i'
i

•

i. -:
!"•••
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V.CriraQS against Peace.

Throughout the years of Nazi aggression, fron 1937 till i9i4-3j the
defendant "70SRIUJN v;as the expert for the developnent of the political

patterns for Nazi aggression. His suggestions becaue the political
masterplans used by Hitler, Eibbontrop and Ueizsaoclzor for the
initiating of invasions and aggressive v/ars* The first exanple is
WOBRIldlN's plan to destroy the sovereign Czechoslovakian State by

various political devices which were paralleled by iiilitary actions«
1. Czccl''<3slovakia,prQ-IiuniQh.

iilrcady in 1937^ while at the 'jcrnan Hubassy in London,T/OSHI-J-TI'J

Tf7as"-Jin contact with Brand the representative of the Nazi Konrad Henlcln^s

Sudeten Geruan Party (3DP)in London(tr.pp.11066,II07I). V.'hilo still in

London, he was inforned of the conference of 29 Uarch 1938 (jlxh.59.
Doc,Book 3-i^ P»C2) and the policy of unconditional Gerr-ian backing of
Hcnlein's demands vrhich it GxprQSsod(tr.pp.11070,11112).
YTliilo originally vievfing the Sudeten GerLian proolom only as a

minority question, ho became aware of its transition to a territorial
solution in sujui-ier 1938 (tr.p,11086/7). he accepted this toivitorial
solution as very v/clcoruG and popular and clair.is that the vrholo Gorman

people shared his opinion (tr,p.ll09'3) - Ho vfas aware of large scale
German military preparations since hay 1938 (trrp.ll083)and realized

'that they might lead to war(tr.p.ll08u). He inihitialod Brand's report
on the Sudeten Gorman situation of 21 July 1938(Bxh.69, Doc.Book 3-*.

P-78), vfhich speaks in very strong terns about "Czechoslovania's
'annihilation b\ G^rnany" and''the wiping off of Czechoslovakia from the

•map" (ibid,p»79). He knew that Italy and Hunga.ry wore preparing for
military assistance ^to Gormpy in her aggression against Czechoslovakia

(Bxh.7U, Doc.Book 3—,p.92,dated 2^ July,1938,knowledge ad-dttod on
tr p 11113), ^-nd ho initiilcd von nrAaannsdorff',s report of 29 i*ugust ^
1938 about his conversations pertaining to plr.ns of Ivongarian parti
cipation in an eventual German-Czech conflict (Dxh.Bl,Doc.Book 3-u
p,106). mt the end of his report Drdi.iannsdorff states tha.t ho is
sending hOCmidiN an extra copy (ibid,p.l08).
-

14 -

\

770KRJ.!ii.Nl\T ' Imovr

of tho oGnacing torns in Hitlur's and Ilibbontrop's

speeches (tr,p,113JL2j see also rjxh,83j Doc.Book 3--». p.110 vfitli
WOSR'iiJm on ihe distribution list),- He thought that Hitler'.s

negotiations in Berchtosgaden and Godcsberg and tho result achiovod
in the Munich Conference viTore a v/onderful success ^ as is ovidoncod

by the following passage in ITOIilRliJ^rns direct testiraony, typical
for lT0j3R:'UiI!N's attitude;
I.

"Q. Did YOU participate in the negotiations in Berchtos

gaden or Godesberg or liunich v/hen the agreor.ient was
•'li

concluded?

No, I vfas in Berlin all the tiicejbut I v/ould nost
certainly not be ashamed of having taken part in
such negotiations. Quito the contrary."
(tr.p,11078)..

On cross-cxar-iination VjOERi'Itv.KN adnxttcd that the Uuni.ch Conforonce,
jr

in which ho so much regrets not to have taken part, '..'•as a i.iajor

diplomatic success for Hitler (tr.p.ll5l2).Ho wonder,since tho result
far exceeded iTOalRI'IdiNN's ov/n proposals for the solution of the Sudeten

Gernan question, v/hich he subraitted botweon berchtosgaden and Godes
berg and which were based on a plebiscite ('tODRllHJN PoXh.l^^^-'OmKflallN
Doc.Book 9 p.35> tr.p. 11085) .He. admits that ho v/as very much

impressed by Hitler's speech in the Berlin Sport Palace of 26 Sept.
1938, from which, "though it vras in ixmy respects more than

exaggerated",he d'crived "great pacification" (tr.p«11090)So far, as to VfOERlMN's knoY/ledge and general •attitude, ;c are
now going to review in detail his participation,

N'OERTMN hliaself adraits in his direct tGstlmony(tr.p. 11037) s

"•^"hilo the Sudeten crisis was on and in "the^period of ^xmo

ir.inGdiately subsequent to the Budeten crisis, the roliwxcai

Division still at least endeavored to exercise an influence
on the course that affairs v;crG taking^.^t that tiiao

Rlbbcntrop still recognized the fact that^he was

_

master of tho problems cropping up, and his oivn woi'ia.ng

staff had not yet been set up by hira."
(Underlining supplied).

Ueiasaecker's letter to tho British ij.ibassador Sir ilovillo

Henderson of 20 July 1938(Sxh,72,DoCoBbok

both

l/OERIi.NW's and •/cizsaeckcr's initials. Thus both share the

responsibility for it. Strangely enough,the defendant V/QDRJiiiJ'RJ does
not raention this docuraont at all in his defense,To avoid repetition,
- 15 "

we refer to pegs 30 • u /

i'.

,

4f the Closing Brief

on Yfeizsaecker,Grilles against Peace*

On lU r^ugust 1933j TfOSHJIiJJTI submitted a raomerandum to Hibbentrop,

containing four proposals ooncerning the Sudeten German a^uestion(Exh,77>
DoCiBook

pi98)jafter' Dr*Iaor, tiio VOM-adviser of the SDP ( see

Bisenlohr testimony tr*p*l6502),after his return from Prague had had a
conversation v/ith YroSRIiil-M's subordinate iJ-tenburg^ whom he asked for

Foreign Office intervention in certain Sudeten German matters(tr .p.
11073).Of particular interest is -[OSHIijni's second rpropofeal:
"In the past, instructions have been issued to tlic

negotiating delegation by VGY'I to appear outwardly to
negotiate seriously. These instructions should be adhered
to in negotiations v/ith the Czech Govornmont as v/ell as in
interviews v.ath Lord Runcii".ian, One could perhaps authorize

Dr.Kier to point that out to the Sudeten OGrmans."
The instructions to simulate serious negotiations,to which

vj'OTIRildJN is referring here, cano originally from Ritler(tr.p.ll073)a
and '[OnJRI'LJJlI's suggestion is to the effect to give them an cxtonsive

interpretation, so as to apply not only to negotiations with Lord

Runcii'-ian, but also to those -v/ith the Czech Govcrnidont.Since Karl
Hermann Frank,Honloin's deputy, claimed to have received special
instructions, unimo^m to

and Dr.Kior, \"A^±ch seemed to be

at variance rrith those referred to in the second proposal,.

suggested in his tliird proposal to have the matter clarified, if
necessary, on a loighor level, adding some suggestions as to the

proooduro(tr.p.ll073A)l"ndQr fisure h (Kxh.77, Doc. Pok 3-.. P.99),
asked Ribbentrop to provide liim v/ith information on

Ribbentrop's interview v/ith Lord ..llan in order to transmit it to
Frank through tho German Legation in Prague."

,,bout the same time, on 19 j^ugust 1938, v/ioilo the SDP, acting as

Hitlor's tool, tried to iuposo its fc.r-roaohing claii,is on tho Czochoslcvak GovGrnuent(tr.p.11508/9roquostod a general increase
of tho regular financial subsidy for the SDP, and this request Yias
grantoda^ib8,Doo.Book 3-..,p.ll) .This shows TrOERiljm's
participation in pui.iping money i>to tho SDP, whoso avowed air.i at
that ttoe was the undorr.iining of tho Czech State and the preparation
of the territorial solution which 'was so dear to '-GERjL.IiH's hoart.
-
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On 16 3ep±jenbor 1938^ Yj'OKRiiJ'JII sent "the folloT/ing instructions to

the German Legation in PraguQ(3xh,3659jDoc,3ook 99-i4. P»17);
"To-night,150 subjects of Czechoslovalcla of Czoch blood v/ero
arrested in 'Germany.This raeasuro is an ansTrer to the arrest
of Sudeten-Gorraans since the Fuehrer's speech of 12 September,
.1 request you to ascertain the. number of Sudeten-Germans
arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible,The
nuiaber of those arrested there is estiiiiated conservatively

at UOO by the Gestapo,Cable Report,"

The purpose of those instructions becomes clear when viewed in

connection with a second telegram, which w'OBRIU^W sent on the f ollovdng
day,17 Soptonber 1938, to the Prague Legation.The Cefonsc introduced
the Berlin copy of this tologram as 'JOFRjUro Zixli.lO7^'G0IiRI-'Ii*NN Doci
Book U p,6, while the Prosecution introduced its Prague copy as

IiJcli,3660,Doc;Book 99-^^^ p.l8i(Tho text is identical, vfhile the respective
translations arc slightly at variance)
This "secret and most urgent" telegram runs as follov^s:

"I.

I request to inform the Govornraont there irm.icdiatoly
of the follov/ingj
The Hcich Govcrnmont ha.s decided that:

a)ii;-u.iediatoly as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
Czoch speaking Jews included, will bo arrested in
Germany as Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia
since the beginning of the vrcok,

b)if c.ny Sudeten Germans should be cxccutod pursuant to a
death sontcnco on the basis of i.'iartial lavf, an equal
numbEr- of Czcclis vfill bo shot in Germany.
For information:

The i.icasuros ad a) luive already been carried out to
the extent that 1^0 Czech citizens have been arrested here.
The Gestapo has assured decent troatuent. The Czoch

Cliargb dhfcffaires has protested yesterday against the
arrests, for the tiiuc being without instructions to do so.
Ho vfas told tliat these wore reprisal measures for the
arrest of Sudeten Germans.

II. In case death sentences. should be pronounced or
executed there on the basis of r.iartial Ieivj", I request to

report in each case imi-icdiatoly by telephone vri-th
telegraphic confirr.iation.

-Ill, us already transmitted by telephone, please report as
soon as possible the total niLubor of Sudeten Gori.ians killed

or injured since 12 ScptcmbGr in riots, if possible by
giving the names and locality as vroll as dates,"

The German Legation in Prague answered this telegram on 19 September
193s to the effect that no definite figures could be established,and
gave only estimates based on information by the German Consulates in

Brno and Reichenberg (V/OFRE'iNN Itch.190.,TJdlSRMANN Doc.Book 9 p.20).
I'OFRlvIAMN' s telegram of 17 September shows that the ratio for the

so-called reprisals,decided upon by "the German Governraent",with other

words by Hitler, was 1 : 1. The defendant WOEmi'VNW admits this (tr.pp,
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11076^11546)« Arrests on the be.sis of this ratio were to be carried
out "immediately", A first batch of I50 Czechs had been arrested on

16 September, and the Czech Chargfe d^iiffaires, who on the very same
day lodged a complaint about these arrests, was told by ^^53?iMANN that
"these were reprisal measures for the arrest of Sude ten-Germans." On

the other hand, the total number of Sudeten-Germans arrested in Czecho

slovakia was not known,but merely estimated by the Gestapo at 400. If

170ERMAMN, in his telegram of 16 September (3xh.3659)^ asked the German
Legation in Prague to check this estimation, .it was obviously for the
purpose of obtaining a factualbasis on which Hitler's decision that the

reprisal measures were to be carried out on the basis of 1:1, could be

carried into full effect. Though VJDSRMANN denied this purpose on cross-

examination (tr.p,1151l) and again on redirect examination(tr.p,11546),
it is clearly proven by 3x:h,3660. This document does not give the

slightest indication to support ViTOSflM/iNN's contention" that the ratio

of 1:1 was restricted to 150"(tr.p,11547)^ with other words that
Germany had decided to abstain from any further "reprisal" arrests,

irrespective of the ansv/or of the Prague Legation as to the number of
arrests on the Czech side.

These mass arrests of Czechs who had committed no offense

whatsoever wore a flagrant violation of international law.The same

aoplios to the threat of killing Czech arrestoes, even if this threat
was never carried out, because it fulfilled its purpose to blaclcraail
f

the Czechs into abstaining from executions on the basis of martial

law,which had been introduced in various Sudeten-German districts.
TJDSRI.CANN' s own Defense Exhibit 189 Section I,^J05E11ANN Doc .Book 9

p.15 shows that martial law had nob been introduced arbitrarily,but
that riots had broken out and acts of violence had occured.

Decisive is the fact that the Sudeten-Germans were Czech nationals;

therefore their arrests on the basis of martial law by the Czech
authorities was a domestic CaeohPslovakian affair,which under no
oiroumstances eould sarve as a legal basis for German "reprisal"

measures. VCmM/Ws lame excuse on cros3-examinafcion(tr.p.ll509)
btiab

"juridically speaking wo couldn't recognize them as German
- 18 -

citiatns, but from the political point of view it was certain
since the Godosberg mee"^ing that the Sudeten-Gerrjans would be

•incorj orated, provided that the problem would meet with a
peacej ul solution" (see also his similar statement on direct

examl-lation t? ♦ p ♦11076),

is not only ir:.*elGyant| but also contrary to the facts, as vrill be
shown by the follovang tiraotable,which, for fairness's sake,is exclusively
based on defense evidence;

a)On tbn evening of l6 September 1938 the British Cabinet heard
a report by Lord Runcinan with the result that, to quote tlie v/ords of

Ilr. Chai±»ffl7lain from "Vi'OBRx'ItfcNN Sxh.188, wOSRIKJRI Doc.Book 9 p.lU,
"naturally, his ilajesty's Government felt it necessary to
consult the French Governraent before they replied to Herr
Hitler, and accordingly M.Daladier and II.Bonnet v/ero
invited to fly to London for conversations v/ith British
iEnisters on September 18."

It mc.y be pointed out in this connection that this docuraont is

comylctoly misrepresented in the respective portion of the index of
•Oi^Riu^HN-Doc.Book 9»

b)

19 September 1938 is the date of the joint British-French

recomi-iendations for a territorial solution(tr.pp.ll076,ll509/lO) •
c) Tliese recomraendations were accepted "in principle" by the
Czechoslovak Govornuont on 21 September 1938,that is five days after
the arrests and \'OBRI'Ii*NN's instructions of l6 September 1938(Ti'OBjRIifcNN

Sbch.189 Section V, HOERIUM Doc.Book 9 p.l9,tr.pp.11088,Il509/l0).
On 2I4 September 1938 there was a sequence to this hostage affair.

On this day, TfOE'.ilf.NN sent a tolegrara to the Geri.ian Legation in Prague
containing the follo7/ing "confidential"inforr.iationj
"Of course,it is out of the question that the Czech hostages
will bo returned in order to avoid the execution of
possible court martial sentences-against Sudeten-Germans".

(Sxh. 91,Doc.Book 3-^^ p.1281Pra:guo copy,

•'fOERIiATN j:xh,35,:/OSmum Doc.Book k p.5;Berlin copy).

70FRIU^*s defense in this matter is that "the hostages had not been

taken for the purpose of being sent to Prague" (tr.p.ll075).
His following denial of "having an^ connection with hostages in this
affair"(ibid,) is clearly refuted by Iihch.3659 and 3660 revicvred above.
On 19 September 1938 V/0SRI4i,NN, after a discussion with representa
tives of tho 3DP, submitted to Ribbentrop a memorandum containing
dstalled suggestions as to the modalities of a plebiscite in tho
- 19 -

Sudoton-Gornan torritorios (TrG^lRi-tJTN Exh,195,"fOSRiitJJN Doc.Book 9 p«35i

authonticatod by "^TOERiiltJJI'I's ov/n affidavit^ TfOERI'IiJW Sx. 196,ibid,p.39).
On 22 September 1939

wrote the following nemorandum

(Sxh,0-386, Doc,Book 206 p.f>)5
"The Repatriation Office for Bthnic Germans had informed
Herr von Stechow here about 6,30 h.in the evening that an
order of the Fuehrer had been received according to which

tl.G Free Corps T/as to occupy those Sudetohr*German areas which
hc.d been vacated by Czech troops, I informed Herr iiltonburg
o:." this fact, v:ho thereafter discussed the matter with
Ooorgruppenfuehror lorenz and General ICeitel, Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz wishes to inform the Repatriation Office for
ethnic Geniians that i t should report to the Free Corps

(Frogner) that tliis aroa should not be occupied. The chief
reason for this is based on reports received by the
•fehrmacht that well-armed Czech troops arc advancing towards
the border. The Free Corps would not be able at aH to cope

with these Czech troops. Hovrcver, that part of the order of
the Fuehrer should bo followed which states that small groups

^

should carry out well-scouted and prepared sorties on a small.
scale on the border, which, however, should not aim at any
occupation of the territory,"

*

This document shoT^s that T'OBRIi'JJN's subordinate iJ.tcnburgj^ discussed

the question of the illegal military activities of the Sudeten German
Free Corps with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz , Chief of the VOIil, and

v/ith ICeitel, Chief of the OKTi', The result, for purely military reasons,
consisted in restricted,but still illegal,military activities of the
Free Corps•

TIOBRIiJJN's own affidavit shows he requested ij.tenburg to have the
^

discussion v/ith Lorenz and Keitels

"For that reason I sought an explanation, and the official
concerned in the Political Department made immediate

f

application to the highest persons to whom he had access,Lorenz

^

and Keitel." O^OSRIIiJJH IJxh.l96,#2,TfanR!:^NN Doc.Book 9 P*hi71
The following documents show V/oERlIiOT's participation in the

/

preparation of a civilian administration for the Sudeten-German
territories in anticipation of their cession to Germany.

In pursuance of a telephone conversation beWoen

and the

defendant Stuckart, the latter in a personal seoret letter of 23 Sept,

1938, sent YfOSBUiM his draft for the temporary administration of the
Sudeton^Gerraan areas(!lxh.C-3U7^ Doc,Book 21^L ?•!)• Stucfcart attached
the draft of a Fuehrer 'Decree setting up IConrad Henlein as Reich
Commissioner" for the Sudeten-German torritbrios, with the request to

submit it to Hitler as StuekarVs suggostion(ibid.p.l;).
— 20

On 26 f-eptember 1938> Yfeizsaecker suggested to Keitel a niilitary
adninistration in case of a peaceful occupation of the Sudeten »-Gerriian

territories(Exh«89,Doc •Book 3-i^ p.l26) •TTOERIMN was infomed of this
conversation (tr»p.ll079). On 29 Septenber 1938,T/OBR[KiI^IlT had a telephone
converse bion -"/vith I'/EIZSAECKER, who at that tine was in Munich, and
informed hin that Stuclcrt had received an order from Hitler to prepare
an independent civilian adrainistration for the Sudeten-German territories,

WOSRl-ltiNN further infomc.d Tfeizsaecker, that he,

had seen to it

that the legal Division of the Foreign Office should bo included in the

preparatory vfork of the. hoich Ivfinistry of the Interior ( Exli.6l5,Doc,Book
l5-i».iP.206),
One day before, on 23 Septenber 1938, on the eve of the Munich

^

Conference ,TrOEI?i-itiM Implemented procautionary measures for tho other

alterne-tive of a wcrlikc solution by sending out tho following

circular telegram to all Gorman missions(Exh,92,Doc.Book 3-^ p.129,
tr.p.ll082)8
" Gcman ships have received orders fron their owners to

leave French, English,Russian and U,S,ij.,ports and, in case
they cannot reach their ports of registry, to call st neutral
ports and watch further developments. Recommended are,first
of £.11, Japanese,Siamese,Italian,Franco-Spanish and Chilean
por es and, socondary,Dutch,Portuguose,Turkish,Central zjmerican
and South xjnerican ports. I roquest that you inform subordi
nated regular Consulates at seaports, as far as possible by
cables in code, and Honorary Consulates at seaports, as far
as it is possible and suitable,"

iklready on 28 Sopteniber 1938 'i70ERI4*HN, through his subordinate

von d'or Hoyden-Rynsch as liaison with tho 0107, requested the OKif to
spare the Hradzin district in case of an air attack on Prague,

"Tho roason^for this request was, among other things,that
close to th: Hradzin most of the Legations are located,
amongst them the German Legation and the Sidss Legation,

which, in tho event of a conflict, v/ould bo expected to
represent tho Gorr.ian interests,"

(I3xh,90, Doc.Book 3-ii.iP»127),

Keitel submitted this request to Hitler, who, after discussing it '
with Gooring, reserved his decision (ibid).

-
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2, Czechoslovakia, post-Munich,

beibre Munich, on 19 S€i:teaber 193S, ihc dexandant
subim.tted a .memorandum to Kibbentrop and weizsaeckar, in which he made impcrtant political suggestions vdth regard to the fiitiro of the rest of

Czechoslovakia after the anticipated territorial solution of the Sudeten
German question. This document which shows

s role as policy mdcer

reveals that already at that time this so-calT.ed territorial solution of
the S\rietai-German question was not oDnsidar-ed by

as the last

v/ord, but only - as it later actually proved to be - as the S.rst steppingk

stone for further territarial changes.

"The momcrancium submittcsd to-day dealir^g vath the chances of a
plebiscite and border correctins in -the Sudeten-Gar*man territo-

f

rs'-" (introckiccd by the defense as
Sch. 195, 'n-ioa^iiam
Dcc.-3ook 9, P» 35) "cjDes not settle "the question ooncernirg tie
fate of the remaining part of Czechcslov<icia; tie problens aris

ing in Slovakia, and finally th-e problon of 2a.st Silesia (area
of Toschen), The following must be stated in comection v^ith
these problems:
I. I\Lch as we arc irterested first of all in t^e fkte of the Sudetcai-Gcrmans and the fate of tie rest of Czechcsldvakia £>r reasons

of fcrcign politics, we should not leave it axcluaively to othc^r

nations CltaLy, England) to advocate a granting cf requests of
Poland and
L. tie same way as kL-esolini iiade himsaLf the
champion of the Huhc^ar ian and. Polish wishes in his Trieste speech,

v^e should find a waj*" to nake^nown publicly that we also support
the wishes of

these two rations.

II. is to the fete of the rest of Czechoslovakia, of theiiany pos
sibilities ranging from a simple ainexation to JRill national indepaidence with and without an international guarantee, the most

c

far-reachihg possibility, namdy that of an annexation Is out of
the question fcr the timo being, since, otherwise, thc^ro would oe
no &er»sc in discussing the terms of the rigjit to autonomy of the.
Su'..-v,te n-G :-n-rrns,

\

jU:- I ••.d..rstand
frcm confidential sources, the Suietai-German
P-^rty has already submitted a proposal to the Fudirer weighir^ the
various possibilities ani advocoating the solution of an independanit Czechoslovakia with special ties attacdiing it to the G^jrman
Reich. This plan provided for an economic aid customs union of
the rest of Czechoslovakia and the German Reich and for Gtimiahy's
military sovereignty over Czechoslovalcia, Howcvar , this suggestion

of th€; Sudctcrt-German Party does not scorn to centsuplato any Ger
man intervention in -tho fe old of police, of racial policies etc.
Ihe idea of an inbornational guarantee is rojcctod, since it im,y
load to CD IB t ant intervention of the guarantor powers.
The request for Gorman military sovsTdgpity would naturally
include the request that Czechoslovakia, withdraw frcm any trea

ties directed against Garman^^ Even if such a far-roabhing tapo^ ^
gram is not dcsirpd. or cannot bo roaiized at the trosent gprncaat.
the request for

the annulment of such treaties shooM be iiade

an independent regie St..

Ill4 Vrr,th re.^ard to tie territoiy of Eastern Silesia (Teschei)
wo Would have to give support to the solution desired by Poland,
even though ther^ is n German Jiincac-ity in that tdritGry.
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IV, Acccrdlng to information recGived from the He.
Ldnistcr,
Poland and
have allef^dly agreed to have besides the
Tesdien area certain smaller areas near tie Polish-Slovakian
border added to Polard. Acccrding to that same source Polard

is otheiwise supposed to be not interested in Slovalda,
It is of course of -vital interest fctr Germany from the

point of -view of politics hov»' the Slovaldan probl an "will be
solved. It is takai for granted that the part bordering on
Huigary "will g> to Hungary with or vdtihout a plebis cite. With

regard to the Pressburg" (Bratislava) "area there shouH be no

requests on the part of Germany, ^though the city of Pressburg itself, situated in a predominantly Magyar country tnd
a German majority, at least before the "war. In this reject

H:-.ng_r.; suppossdi^y received already some promises from autho
ritative cdrclos in Germany.
ViTith regard to the rest of Slovakia, Hungar-y's goal is no

doubt
bave this country added to Hungary, thou^ it is to be
largely autonomous. W'c should not object to these goals. Vie do
not have to bo afraid of the one fact, speaking against this
solution, namdy that a common border bo-ti;eon Hungry and Po
land mil thus be created. If
c^e of plebiscite ihe quest
ion is alskcd: Do you want to join Hungary? Du ;.ou want to have
an autonomous state or c3o you want to continue to be a rest of
Czechodovskia?, it is hard to predict the result with certain
ty, At «ny rate there is no guarantee in predicting the vote
vdll bo fbr Hurg ary,
V, Finally thor^ ought to be a spedsl regulation with regard -bo
the Ulcrainians in Cs^chos lovalda,
VI, Under no cLrcumstancos must the silntion cf

-the Sudeten-German

question bo ddayed by neg)tiatlois and discussicns on the afb remaitioned problems. For these reasons we will teve to see
to i t that in futire discussions with the British the S»fi>^enGwman nroblons on.the one hand and the other problems on the

other liand bo treated differcntlywith ros^r'd "bo time. The Hun

garians ani Polos must bo vion for this idea.

(signed) V/ocsrjiann,"
(Bxh. C-3S5, D"C.-3ook 206, pp, 1 ff., underling supplied)
In his offerts to weaken the impact of this document, WOEEMaNH does not

hesitate to take a leaf out cf i/u^zsaedc'r ^s book by stating in his perti

nent dofonso affidavit (W'^ormann Sh, 196, #1, Wocrnam DK>c.-3^k 9> P*4^)j
"If I rejected the idea of annexation mth the ajpparent reserva
tion of 'for the time being', this was a mode of speech which
Was unavoidable if one desired xS-^boitrop to show any interest,"
The Trdbuiial has soon sufficient oxamplcs to draw its conclusions from

the ovQT-ropeatod claim that her ever something parti cularly unpleasant and
damaging appears in a document, it -was not '/d-zsao ckor's (^n this instance

WOERMaNN's) language, but Hibbentrop's*
AS to the last section of the memorsndum, history actually followed
Woermann'.» .^ttorn.

claims of the Poles and Himgaidans remained with

out seiilemenb in Munich" (tr. p, 11391), thou^ it did not take long till
Poland, oneouraged by Germany's example, took iinilatqnal action by annexa

tion of the Olea district (ibid). Nor did Hungary allow much time to elapse
- 23 ^

before urg:.ng her territorial daims, and already on 5 October 193® Woq?mann subinittcd a niemaranduni through vveizsaeck csr to Ribbentrop in "which he
made detailed suggostiors veith regard to ihe forthcoming discussions be-•
\

iween Hurgairj'' and Czedioslovci'da. This is Exh. 9®, D*.^c,-3ook 3-3, "k- 243,.
the most important parts of which arc being quoted hereafta?:

'''E'K; imminent openipg of negDiia"tions betv/een CaedioSlovakia and
Huh;;ary in the first place necessitates ihe forming of an intern
al Gvjrman opinion on the S,vOvJk prdbleou But there also are
questions which ought to be discussed immediately vdth Hur^ary.
I.Brertislava and "the nei^boring areas.

Starting point :

1) If there is a plebiscito in li. ^tislava^ it ou^t to b e examined
whether a possibility should not also be given of -voting for Ger
many. In this case it would have to bo expected tiiat the najority
of the Slovaks would -woto for G^>rm,^,7

2)3rid..ehead of S'^erau.
Gcrmjn demand that bridgehead b^ given to G^iViany, with or without
a plebiscite? If with plebiscite, >German najority certain, if pl<dd
cite is made on 191® basis, olherwise very doiiotful. Immediate
•cresenoation to Hun..ary of our claim desirable, so lhat Huqgary
may not negotiate with Caechoslovakia rcgarciLi^ -this region ....

3)Reaaon of Th.-oui:
♦

Incorporation into Germany not to be sought

II. The Slovak Problem.

4 theorietical possibilities.

1) Independent S^ovJcia,
2) Autonomous Sloval<ia vdth cxLose relations to Hurie^ary, whidi
inight take any form from an alliancv. to inccrporation,

3) Autonomous Slovalrzia leaning on Peland,
4) Autonomous Slovakia within C>i..ch federation.
ad l);Solution most fr^-yorable to us - independent Slov^ia •.
A^- itndependcarit S -^v.kia v<?ould be a woalc political organism and
hence ^.ould
th>. p^st assistance to the Gasman need for ad
vance and settling space in the East. Point of least resistance
in the East.

ad 2}

Germany not interested in this solution

ad 3) ••• 0^ interest in an autonomous Slo-vakla loaning on
Poland is oven less than leaning on Hungaay. Ihrough Ihe acqjiLsitlon of tiio region of Teschen Poland has already received a
♦;
i

substantial increase in powo? in Ihis area. A sphere of Polish
economy, enlarged by Slovakia, could put considerable difCiciflties in -Iho way of German econoiaic endeavors in the Southeast.

ad 4) •• An autonomous Slovakia leaning on Gzechoslovdcia,
porimps oven v.'ithin a Czcchoslovdc federation, vjould be prefer
able to the Polish and Hungarian solutions as the lesser evil.

IH. Carpatho-Ukrainian Question.
.... liaybo conceivable as starting point for future greater Ukrai

ne, but at present lack of suitable leading poisons • Political inrdependenco hardly to be considerod at this time.

Hungarian desire evidently se^ks annexation with autonomy.
This also seems to comply with Polish desires as in this way a

common Hungaro-polish frontier would bo created and Poland does
not show any interest in the increase of the Ukrainian minority ...
In case of an independent and weak Slovakia, the leaning on Hun-

garjr of the Carpatho-Ukrainian area is less risky; a Huhgary

friendly to Germany would also lesson the iii^ortance of this teriltory as a bridge for the SovtQt Union.
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If Hur^ary had not to bo considered, the support of a weak
and independent Slovakia vouLd bo the best solution. This w.ou3d
avoid the creation of a common frontier beiy/een Poland and Hun-

gapy*! deemed undesirable also by tie SupreiiE Command of the

Weiu?macht

IV. Qernan Language Islands.

• »... The tvao first-maitioned language islands" (Proben and
Kremnitz) "should not bo resettled because they are valuable a
as starting points for future development in the Jj)ast.
V. Summary.

l) For Bratislava, demand piobis citu and not anrexation by Hun
gary and infer m Hungary to this offoct,

2') For Ergcrau inform Hungary that vio claim this territory and
that thoy have to disinterest thcmsoLvcs.

3) For Slovakia., unless she boccraes independent by way of inter
ior dLssoluticn, donahd plebiscite and let it develop freely.
During pldxLs cite, ocibupation absolutely necessary beeaus e

'

otherwise it will be .InfLuencod by the Czechs.

y

If.) Far Carpatho-Ukraine demand plebiscite. Should Hungary be
given any promise of this territory? If so, only for Eaton

*•

^

tip (see above).
5) No anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish slogan to bo gLvon out in

public, but self-determination to bo demanded for Slovdcs
and Carpatho-Ul^rainians. Besides demand for sdf-dotermina
tion also hint at demand for autonoiiy as tho final issue

is veiled in this way.
6) Permit ethnic Gorman groups to -rote. This means practically
decision against Hungary.

(signod) Vjoermann."

(Underscoring supplied).
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^

W05Ei/IVl!ir

admits that he is not very proud of

memorandum (tr^p•11094) •

having drawn up this

He resorts to the well-lmown thin excuse;

"Already other defendants who testified before me testified
as to the necessity that often occurred of using a certain

jargon, a certain phraseology, in anything that had to be
submitted to the ^eich Minister if they were to hope that
anything was to be*gained by submission# I did this as little
as I possibly could, but nevertheless there are a few terms
contained in this memor?Jidum which are clothed in .

this specific phraseology," (tr#p#11093^ see also crossexamination
VJOERMANN's

tr .p#11513)•

claim that

"not a single one

of these suggestions

*'

was ever put into effect"

ai^

the historical facts# V/OSISiiAKN 's main proposal of an independent

*•

(tr»p*11094) is clearly contradicted by

and weak Slovakia did become a fact in March 1939^

WOSE?MAI'IN

himself testified to i t on cross-examination:
r

"Q,

Slovakia, as a newly*created and weak state, became a

satellite of ^©rmany, is that correct ?
A-.

I wouldn't be vdlling to use the word 'satellite*,

but yes, Slovakia would become an independent state,"
(tr,p,11514^ see also tr,pp. 11515^ 11547)•
It is true that Vfeizsaecker's circular telegram of 10 October 193S

(Ex,99, Doc .Book 3A p#24S) which, WOIEIMAlN believes, originated in the
Political Division (tr.p,11094), contains instructions for the language
to be used which are at variance with some of I70SEtM"dCN's suggestions,

but Vieizsaecker*s slogan of "self-determination" (#6 ibid. p.249)
t

is quite in line with WOSRfaANW^s basic attitude, and ^ieizsaecker

i

X

•

'

himself, v^hen commenting on this document, pointed out how much this

slogan of "self-determination" was abused by Hitler six months later

(tr#p.77B7). ^e Carpatho-Ukrainian questions were actually settled
in the Vienna ilrbitratidn Pact of 2 Novemboi* 193B ('[oermann Ex.43,
Woerm-nn Doc .Book 4 p.l?). WOmiAKN participated in the negotiations

in vixich Germany opposed the Hungarian claims which were supported by

/

Italy (br.p.ll097/S). ^he result left every one dissatisfied
(tr.p.iiioo),

Already on 12 November 193^, V;0SRMAN17 submitted a memorandum to
Weizsaecker on "Dangerous developments in connection with the

Cnrpatho-Ukrninian Problem,"

(Exil05, Doc,Book 3B p,263).

"^he

Polish Government and Press had dtarted a campaign for the cession
of the rest of

Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, in order to achieve a

common Polish-Hung-^xian frontier,

sit nation,

After reviewing the political

makes the following suggestions:
"Suggestions for the future handling of this problem:
1) Get in touch ivith the Itn,lian Government immediately.
The Italian attitude to-date had been uncertain, to say
the least,

2) Common Italo-German representations if possible to be
made at Budapest to request Hungary to observe the
Vienna decision in all circumstances .and to prevent
all subversive cactivity.

3) At this stage of developments similar representations
f

to the Polish Government would seem to be out of the

question on account of the other familiar problens

*'

involved.
4) '•^'he question of the ^erman-Itcalian guarantee for
Czechoslovakia should be examined in this connection,
would not however seem to be particularly urgent until
the frontier has been finally fixed,

5) To counter-act Polish activity we shall probably have
to support the remaining Carpatho-Ulo'ainian territory
economically and financially as soon as possible.

The preparatory work in this connection is done by
Socrotary of State Keppler in cooperation with the
Foreign Organisation and the ^Volksdeutsche liittel. stelle'. Furthermore, one of the first steps to be
taken will be the

establishment of a G'ermnn Consulate

General in the now capital of Chust."

(Underscoring supplied, 5bc,105^ Doc.Book 3B, p.264).

WGSRLiiAT'II'J

comments upon this document to the effect that his

opposition .against the joint Hung-'^ian-Polish frontier was "not a

»

dogma., but rather a matter of political opportunism"

(tr.p,1110l),

"However, «as a matter of course, I ^Iso judged the situation

from the viewpoint of ^©rman interests, and seen from that
point of view, I expected nothing very good to come from the

well-knov/n Polish tendencies and claims," (tr.p,11101/2)^
His further statement:

"I think that whatever I may have put down in writing in
connection with these incidents

proved of no influence

at -all (3.n world events and world developments" (tr.p,11102)
is much too modest and contra,dicted by WOERIiANN himself, since, on the
s.arae page of the transcript, he points out

that the Vienna Arbitra.tion

Pact, whoso maintenance was the objective pursued in his memorandum,
did remain in force till March 1939

when Hungary received the rest
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of the Carpatho-Ul-craine. The '^erman Consulate '-^gneral in Chast^
whose creation ViOSE^lAIlv' had suggested in his memorandum was

actually established (Affidavit Hamilkar Hoffmann^ .Woermann Ex.45^
Woermann ^^oc.Book 4 p.24/25)•
economic <and financial support
of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which V^OEElMAI^jN also discussed v;ith the
defendant Keppler (tr.p.11103), served the purpose to ensuie continued

subservience of the remaining Caipatho-Ukraine to the foreign policy
of the Third ^ich •

On 18 November 193S, V/OERHU^^I, as -Toizsaecker's deputy, and
✓

official representative of the Foreign Office, attended a top policy
making conference of the Reich Defense Council, in which all Ministers

and State S^crotaries, with few exceptions, were present (Sx.l06,
Doc.Book 3B, p.265). Goering gave a lecture of three hours, in the
course of ;vhich the ^ield Marshal termed it

"the task of the hgich ^efense Council to correlate all
the forces of the nation for accelerated building up

of German c?.rmament,"
and further stated:

"The assignment is to raise the level of a,rm.amont from a

current index of 100 to one of 300." (ibid,p.266).
admits that he realised that his would mean a consider

able increase of armaments (tr,p.11117), but claims that he was under

the impression that G^i'nioj;iy -^^.s at that time still far behind the
'armament level of other large powers (ibid^)
170ERMAN!7k* complied a long memorandum on the meeting -and sub
mitted it to Ribbentrop
On

Qhiof of

(ibid.)

23 November 1938,

VJOSRi-IAirN had a discussion with Keitel,

about plans for the reorganisation of the Czech

ArnQT, (Ex.107, Doc .Book 3B p.269).

Keitel told VJOEEUi^TJN that the

proposals which Buerkner, at the request of the ^Qroign Office, had
worked out for the 0K17, should not be submitted to the Czech foreign
Minister Chvalkov;sl<y in their existing form.
^ 28 -

Keitel suggested instead

to ask Chvalkowsky "how he imagined the militpjry relations should be^
and then, if the case arose, to reject the proposals until something
useful would result".

WOSttMiilW submitted this suggestion, which, he admits

"sounds a

little bit unfriendly" (tr.p„11108), together with Buerkner's memo
randum bo Hibbentrop.

At the same time, negotiations

for a so-called "Friendship Pact"

were going on between ^^rm?ny and Csechodovakia, and Ga,us, as Chief

of the Legal J^ivision, worked out a draft of a Treaty to be concluded
between Hitler and Hacha, to which V/CSRIvIAIH^ refers in the same document

5bc.l07,Doc,Book3B,p,269, and which the Defense introduced as Woermann
Sx,46, VJoermann ^oc.Book 4^ p«26» WOSRiiAMv calls Gaus^s draft
very attractive, but still far better than what

1939" (tr.p,11106),

"not

happened on 15 IJaifch

The draft vas to be discussed with the Czech

Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky, and 7JD5HMA1«JTT, deputising for the State
Secretaryv compiled lengthy secret notes for this conference and,

together with the draft, book them to Hibbentrop (tr»p.lll05)•
T/OSRLIANII's notes are contained in Ex.108, Doc.Book 3A p«273 and read,
in part, as follows:
"Attached is submitted the draft of Ministerial Director

Gaus concerning a Treaty of T'riendship between Gormany
and Czechoslovakia.

}

The individual questions bo be dis

cussed with Forc^^gn Secretary Chvalkowsky are takcai

point by point in the follovjing in the sequence of this
rough draft.

1. Question of the Guarantee (Section 1 of the draft),
• • • ."^he goal should be reached that Czechoslovakia on her
side should inform Fj,anco and England that she renounces
a guarantee by these States.

The ^tlhsrer has already stated in the conference with
Chvalkovsky dated 14 October 193S that a satisfactory
rejuaoiuiisnip between ^ermany and Czechoslovakia could be
developed if the laitter understood her role and became

aware of the fact that English and ^rench guarantees
are .lust as worthless as the Treaty of ^illiance with
France or the pact with Eussia were in the course of the
crisis, and that the only effective guarantee is that

of ^r^many.
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Section 2 of the agreeji^nt dr=iftj v/hich will be gone/fully

here under number 2^ contains, moreover, the obligation of

Czechoslovakip, not to conclude such treaties vdth tliird powers.
"^here would then remain the question of the Italian guaranfeee

cqnceming v:hleh It-aly ought to be spokai to before the negr-tiat-

iqng with Czechoslovakia. Shall thingqstop with the Italian

guarantee or is an exclusivoly "German guarrantee to be given ?
2,Foroign Policy of Czechoslovakia (Section 2 of the draft).
In the draft it is provided in sub-paragraph 1 of Section 2
bha.t Czechoslovakia shall behave in all questions of tho

foreign^policy of'her country in touch and-agreement with the
G-orman Government,

It is to be tested how far individual questions of foreign
policy are'to be discussed o.t the present conversation with
Chvalkovsky»

•^no following, among others, come into consideration:

a) the vjithdrawal of Czochoslovalcia from the League of Nations;
b) The accession of Czechoslovakia to the ^"intikonintern Pact

(v.'hich requires Italian and Japanese assent); probably
premature at present.

c; The recognition of Franco by Czechoslovakia. Franco has
asked for"our intervention for this purpose.
Section 2, p<aragraph 2, considers that Czechoslovakia's

previous treaties of alliance and support are objectless,and
contain

the obligation not to conclude treaties of this kind

in future with third pov'jers.

This question stands in" the

closest connection with the guarantee question, since, as shown
above,CzGchoslovakia*3 hitherto existing treaties of the kind,
according to Jhglish-French interpretation, are to be repla ced
by an international guairrjitee..,.

^

3.i'ilitaiy questions (Section 3 of the draft).
The draft implies a skeleton agreement. Czechoslavakia's
obligation should be to adaot her military defensive power
to the military interests of
This obligation is made
palatable by representing it -as a consoquonco of the German
guaraiitec. Acceptance by Czechoslovakia would be facilitated
perhaps if the wording v/as not to the effect that Czechoslov^Jcia
is to adapt her dofeneive pov/er to the militnry interests of

Germany, but to'their mutual interests'.

t

That would be

exclusively a question of precise wording#
According to the draft the details are to be agreed upon
by the military headquarters. Of course, the military head
quarters have not to make decisions about them alone.
The final decision even concerning milit-'ry matters is much
more a political one.
But this does not need to bo stated

in the agreement, •'•he words 'between the milit'-xy headquarters
on both sides' could also be erased, however.

FqI- the conf erences with Chvalkovsky thc^Ghief of the High

Comriiand of the V/ehrmacht

recommends that we do not come to

Czechoslovrjtia with definite demands but petition CHyALKOVSKX

on his side for proposals, vhich would be declined until they

correspond to our wishes."

(This point was -already discussed by ^'^oermann in Sxh.107,
Doc,Book 3B p.269^ dated 23 Kovoraber 193S, see above).

"4.Economic Stipulations (Section 4 of the draft).

Details could probably scarcely be discussed with Chvalr,t tho present stage. If the latter c.amo out on his

side with the suggestion of a currency and customs union, this
would be the best procedure. Otherwise he could be given bo
understand that our intentions are aimed in this direction.
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5« Questions of Home Politics.

It hns nlre^.dy been pointed out nt the onrlier
conferences of the Flihrer

and of the

Hinister

for Foreign Affairs v/ith Ohvalbovsky thnt Czecho
slovakia must give up her press and propaganda
policy....
A prohibition

of the Comunisb Party, as has

already been pronounced in Slovakia,

must be secua-ed

vjibhoub its being" laid dovm in the Treaty.

For the rest, an extensive assimilation to the
internral Gorman structure livill ha.vG to be sonsummatcvd

by Czechoslovakia herself, if she concludes a currency
and customs union, -^uch a union 7vOuld probably not bo
conceivable unless the liber?:>J. OGonomic policy of
Czechoslovakia ceased and unless the standard regulations

for ^erman economic management (including the regulations
concerning Jews) had acceptation ".Iso in Czechoslovakia,
Beyond this, an assimilation of the internal
political structure of Czechoslovakia, especially

'

with'regard to the question of the Jev;s, Freeiuas

,

etc., is to be desired,

;

'ihis could bo pointed out bo

Chvalkovsky, 'VJithout laying direct injunctions upon
hLm at the present stage.
Obligations of the kind do^Jiing with hone

politics cannot, of course, be _ii,'iPps_^^_ upon Czechosloyakia in a treaty destined for publication.....

Especially

in view of the unsavory last section of this

documont, ViOEFlLU-H'J's comment,
"On my part, I ondoavored, at least' as far as the
form was concerned, to inbroduco a few alleviating

circumstances into'iiis draft" (tr,p.lll06),
has not a leg to stand on.

'^he whole document certainly shows the defendant
at his worst.

It is not redeemed

for a pact of "friendship"

vfOERI..Al\^I

by the f-.ct that the negotiations

were broken off about a month later,

%

"without leading to a definite result (tr.p.lllOS)^ since they were

A

superseded by

more far-rea,ching plans.

;\nother document, which belongs bo the s"me period, shows

VJDERIIAKH''s participation in O-orman attempts to bake influence on
do^iestic military affairs of Czechoslovakia.
5 December 1938

In a belfigr^'^jn of

V'OERivLU:!! informed the G-^rman Legation in Pr<ague

that he had no objection against

submitting to the Czech Goverriment

Goo ring's wish that a certain gener'^'-l should be appointed

Supreme

Commijider of the Czech Air Force (Ex.liO, Doc.Book 3B p.286),
31 -

WffT III

On 29 Novv3niber 193S V/OSRLLil'JII sent an intor-officc manior-^Jidasi

to the Porsonnal division of tho Foreign Office, requesting to refimo
the SD with expenses up to 6000 •^•^•ichsmnrk

for their fin-^ncing-of

'journeyd of Slovnki.-^Ji Ministers nnd other official porson?,iities to

study State ^nd Party institutions in Germ''ny (ex.109. Doc .Book 3B
p.279).

This memorandiun is unsigned, but headed "Undersecretary of

State"

nnd approved and initialed by the defendant TTOjEUil!!'', after

his deputy Prince Bism-arck had initialed it with the handwritten

addition

"Recommended",

The amount

was actu-'^J.ly p.aid (ibid.p.2S3).

However, the memorandhm covered a wider fifLd.
"SD asked at the same
for such expenses in
putting informations
Foreign Office. The

It further stated

tiirie to bo gr-^nted a regular subsidy
the future. As .an equivalent, SD is
received at the disposal of the
first s'ijnples submitted proved very

useful." (ibid,p.279). '
A sample of such information is 3x, 103, Doc,Book 3B

p.259^ an

SD report on a discussion vdth Sidor, the leader of the Slovak Hlinka

Guards, of 1 November 193B, which shows th.at

Durcansky and

Tuka wore seeking Gorman aid bo break away from Czechoslovakia and

proclaim an independent Slov-^Jc Sj-nte.
Political Division (tr.p.11103).
subsidised

The report was filed by the

Exhibit 109 shows that UOjURI.^'JN

the SD, an organisation declared criminal by the lilT,

in order to obtain infcumiation, which seemed useful to the Foreign

Office for its purpose of preparing,^ the aggression against
slovakia,

It is strange that VjOERIiAIIN doeS nob even mention this

document in his defense.

,'-AV.q ''V
• *I- **
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Czecho

('• a

On 12-January 1939j Pol.IV drafted a memorandum suggesting to

Ribbentrgp to request Hitler t® gran"^ a subsidy @f 1.800,000.Heichsroark out of Winter Relief Funds I'to al3.eviate the plight of

ethnic Germans in Qzechoslovakia proper''. 'Hie memprandi^ v-'as approved

and initialed by vroEEAiAHTR and signed by Weizsaecker- ^^i,i^^Dqc.Book

3-Bj p.304),. Hitler granted the request, and on 14 January 1939,
W0SRM4NN approved and initialed several telegrams, signed by

V7eizsaecker, vrhich implemented riitler's decision (ibid.pp,3'^6~308)•
On 12 March 1939, WOSRlifiJN's subordinate Altenburg in a telegram
vdth the File Number Pol.IV transmitted Ribbentrop's instructions

to Bratislava that the German Consul there should support the

aotivities of "certain agencies", /dthout, hoviever, compromising

his own position. (Sx.lOR, Doc.Book 3-B, p.280)„ id the same time
TOERMANM was officially informed of the military side of the
aggression, since the German top secret military demands for an

ultimatum, dated 12 March 1939, had, on Hitler's instructions

been forwarded by OIC to the Foreign Office, where WOERMAi''jN

appears on the distribution list (Ex,118, Doc.Book 3-^-, p.313)- ^
These were the same demands which President Hacha v/rs forced to

accept on I5 Ijferch (Ex..123, Doc.Book 3-E, p,331-d.)*
of-the march Into Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939, Pol-IV drafted

the following urgent telegram to the defendant Idtoer, who w^-S

at that time in Prague (Sx.l24, Doc.Book,3-B, p.332)"Please immediately seize cipher office and all mterial

j-

belonging to it In the Czech Foreign Office, and seal it
UD.Directions for further action follow later^

This telegram was approved and initialed by WOERIMN and then
signed by 'Weizsaecker.
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3t Poland

VroERlilMW, who^ as shovm in the preoeiing paragraph, took a particular
interest in Slovakian affairs, continued to handle the Slovakian s^de in

the preparation of the next aggression, against Poland. In Ex. 3661, Doo.

B.99-A, p.2r), on 4 May 1939., we see him setting the agenda for a aei-man-

Slovak military conference. This ms, as IfOSRi-IAUiT admitted on cross-exami-?

nation, at a time ''when the Polish question had come into the fcregrcund
of Germann foreign policy" (tr.p.11517). In his telegram to the German
Consulate General in Bratislewa WOERMhUl' states, a.o.:

"Negotiations about military questions will refer to
a) delimitation of protected zcne,

b) organisation of traffic, post and telegraph, counter—intel
ligence, importation of militarily important goods,
c) •giilitary interests outside the prctectod zone,

d) preparation of the future organisaticn of the Slovak Army,
Negotiations are to be conducted in a friendly spirit with the
view to persuading the Slovaks that fulfilment cf the German
Yfishes is in the common interest. For the planned agreement,

as far as possible, forms are to be found vjhioh make it appear
ds an impleipentation of the Protective Trea'cy and take into
consideration the Slovak national sensibility. As far as neces

sary, individual items may be settled by secret agreements.
Legation Councillor Lolimann will be assigned to the Germ.an de
legation

"

A week later, on 11 May 1939, V/OEHvIAl^-i sent the fcllowing written

order to the German Ambassador in London (Ex.C-388, DoCj.B >206, P.8):
"In consequence of an intensified campaign of hate systemati
cally carried on by the anti-Gsnmrn organisations despite
continued and serious representations on the part of the German
Government, persecution of all classes belonging to the Germci-n
minority in Poland, especially in the former Prussian provinces,f
>

,

hasi for some considerable tine, been on the increase. From the
attitude of Polish Government departments it must be inforred
that they are neither seriously inclined nor apparently in a
position to put a stop to this development. Since the C-or^
minority press in Poland is prevented by rigorous censorship

from reporting fully on these anti-German excesses, the repots

by the Lrman ccnsular agents in Poland arc, apart from reports

by the Deutsohes ITaohrichtenbucro, the only reliable
of information shedding a light on the actual position of the
German minority. I enclose herewith copies of a number of

sXroports on ar.ti-German measures and incidents, and terther
reporte will in futere bo regularly submitted for your informa
o"?hirmaterial in your contacts with the Bratrsh Go^rnment.

tion with the request that you mr.ko the bes. possible use
- .i.

T5

V

A ni»te in the German ^.mite Book

•) stotes teat the Germr.n Embassy

) suawo

y

in London actually made use of 1heee reports.

oA 8 July 1939 WOEiaiiiin.>I sent the following circular tologrcuii to a
great number .f German foreign missions (Ex,156, Doo.B, 4-ii, p.155).
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"If necessary, I beg y©u to use in talks the follovdng from
a regulatirn concerning language as given by the Reich Foreign
Minister in conneoticn to the problem of Poland:

Vfe will not renounce the hope that sensibility will be
regained and v^ill predominate in Poland, because we did vrt
lock for the crnfliot, but for the solution of the probleiii '
We could hardly imagine that ruiy sensible Pnle would want to
expose the fate cf Poland to a lightning and devastating c rup

of the German fist, v/hich is to be expeotedo The one and vaily
acute-danger "vdiich we could see for the dist iibance of the
.jKuropoan peace would exist in a harakiri policy, initiated
through such Pelish excesses which Germany as a great and pa
tient nation could no longer ignore as it has done up till nov/.
It would be very much v/anted if this contemplation "Vi/ould be cQirr
.ing soon, for it would be ra-tiier hazardous to draw differences
like these German-Polish ones out too long, and it is hardly
to be answered for uncjr the vievjpoint of a general European

conflict" • (Underscorjjng
WOEEIviiilTh':

supplied )

oommenis on this document as follov/s:

"I can only repeat vfhat Kerr von Weizsaecker already said aboui;
Sx, 153, that it-A-as not only good, but absolutely neoescary
that our Ghiofs of Mission abroad should know wiiat sort of

language Herr von Ribbentrop was using", -(Tr.p»11127)
This is completely misleading, because WOERI>;IhlIi.i knows just as well as
Weizsaecker that the purpose of such instructions for the language to be

used (Sprachregelung) was not to inform the mission chiefs about T,diat
Ribbentrop was saying in Berlin, but to instruct the mission chiefs in
the interest of coordination, as to what language they wore to use them

selves in their dealings "vvith the respective Govornmonts to which they
were accredited, 'foizsaccker himself admitted this in the course of his

cross-examination (Tr. po 8721),

In the rfiiddlc of August WOERIvRiNlI' s Political Division was preparing
material on alleged Polish oxoosscs for a speech which the defendant Bohle

was going to deliver in Danzig on 21 i±ugust (Ex,171, DcooB.4-B, p.39).
It is in the lust stage of the Polish crisis that wo find WOERIt^iAifi-i partioularlyjaotive, On 22 August 1939 a Foreign Office momoraudum v/as submitted

to Ribbentrop containing suggestions for "special political declarations",
(Ex, 178, Doo,B,4-B, p»72) This memorandum, though unsigned, must have
originated from the Political Division, since the subject matter is one

of foreign policy,

WOERJVL'jNN himaolf partially admits this:

"In the manner the document is available hero I cannot rcmombcr

it. Some of the things it contains, howovor, certainly
from the Political Division", (Tr,p.11134)
The memorandum reads, in part, as follows:
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"In caso of compliofcfions loading up to war vdth Poland a Puchror
Proclamation may bo oxpcotod which will then servo the German

missions abroad^as guidance in their verbal dealings and should
also form tho basis of ©cnvorsations with the fespoctivo roorGsontatives of foroign powers; howovor, it will bo dosirablo"to ,
supplement such general verbal guidance by a spccira polj.ti.cal '

doolc-rat-ii^n which should be kept within tho frame of tho"~^^oral

guidance for verbal dealings. Since declarations of this nature
are the mere effective tho quicker they are made, it vdll bo ad-

vioable to outline their tenor hero and nov/. The following parti
culars should bo adhered to;

1.) Franco and England^

Both those governments should be advised formally that we

have na hostilo intontions against them. Hovfovor, should they, on
their part, interfere in the conflict with military measures, we

.should regard those as aggressive acts aimed at us and, of course,
react accordingly.

2.) Belgium
Tho statement of tho Germcji resolution contained in tho

Gorman-Belgian oxchango of Notes of IS October not- to impair tho
Belgian inviolability and integrity of Belgium under any circumstonacs and t.3 iv^spoct Belgium territory at all times should bo

restated,

Buolcw-Sohwair

'4 ^

(following a suggestion by iim-bassadcr von

form of a verbal declaration to tho

Belgian King.

) Nothorlands, Luxembourg
Those oountrj.os, too, should be given to \uidcrstand that
if they maintain their neutrality towards 'us, wo are resolved to
rospoot the integrity of their territory. Tho Ministers should be

instructed to make these doolarations if possible to tho Head of
State porsomlly or, if that is impoi^siblo, to tho Chio-f cf Govorn•lent.

6.) Dcmark
A roaffirmation cf tho Gor.ian-Danish Non-Aggression-Pact
of 31 May last should bo given to tho Danish Government.

7.) Lithuania

In doai^mg with tho* Lithuanian Govern:lont, cnly the assu
rance of non-violcnco in accordance with tho M':j;icl Agrcencnt of

22 March last should bo confirmed. Thc^rospcctive doclarauion,
however, should bo couched in particularly friendly tonas, possibly
indioa-ting 'sur bonovo.lont attitude tov^ards the Lithuajiian

aspirations on Vilna.
8.) Slovakia.
its regards a declaration to Slovakia, the needful has
boon done already. Beyond that,-the guaranty of torritcrial

integrity could bo renewed and,tho return of tho border district
ceded by Uor to Poland promised to Slovakia.
9 r) Hungary.
The ar.iicablo inf-smaticn to tho Hungarian Govommont in

regard to our attitude should bo coupled with a warning not to
make tho events in its neighborhood the occasion for ill-

considorod resolutions., but to keep in closest contact with us

in regard to all questions ocnnootod with tho eonfliot.
10.) Yugoslavia,

Tho Yugoslavian Govoriimont should be given to understand
that wo oxpoct an attitude of bcnevolont neutraliiy from that
country in case of a spreading of tho conflict.
11.) Rumania.
The asBuranoo will ho renov/od to too Rumanian King that
wo havo no hostilo intontions against Runmia, but wish to

continuo our present friendly relations, oxpoctiiig, ho^^ver,
that Rimiania will pursue a policy of strict neutrality and
r.mintain the Gorr"ian-i.tu3"i.-.'nian ooonomio relations in full cporation.

Horowith proeontoi. to the Koich Minister of Foroign
Affairs with tho request for instruction whether, if the oooasion
arises, tho rospaotivo dirootives for tho nissiona involved should
bo subriittcd
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On 21 August 1939 a subordiiiato of WGEHiLJJiiM, Logation Counsillcr
T«n dor Hoydon-Ryiisoh of Pol,I subnittod a top scorot noriorandu--.i to

WOERKtiW with tho rcquost for his docision (Ex,C-387, DogcBc2C6, p=6).
In this nonoraadun, -vftilch WOERMAITO initialed, von dor Hcydcn-Synsoh

refers to his provjipus top soorot nonorandun of 16 August 1939, in -whioh
he reported on tho noasurcs tho OKW was going to tako on tho day prc^

ceKing/invasion of Poland (f-DayJ, such as a conploto nows blackout
and clfflsing of the frontier. The sa:-io ricasuroe v/ill, with certain ox-

cGptions,also corio in force vdth regard to Lithuania, Tho OiOf/ and tho
Amy High Coraiand

"are of tho opinion that it :aay bo advisable for tho Poroign
Offico to send a Note to tho Lithuanians, v/hcn tho noasurcs

arc intreducod, in which they are told that this closing of
tho frontiers doos not roprcaont an unfriendly act, but is

only nooossary for nilitary reasons. In this connocti./n one
could ppint out tho danger of Foli.sh attacks cn tho Gcman
flanks via Lithuanian territory and refer to our intention

to pcmit a loss controlled infonaation service and passongop
and goods traffic as soon as events begin to toko a nomal •'
course

It has boon proi-iis^d'.- that tho cerApetont dcpartrAonbs within -

tho Foreign Office will cxanlno tho suggestions nado by the
Suprono Cornand of tho •VTehmaoht and that an irinodiato answer
on tho subject will bo given,"
On 23 August 1939 VOERIyhiiLA took a decisive part in the preparation of
tho aggression fro?! ti^o Slovakian side, with which ho was partiou.lar-ly _
fanillar. On this day he sent tho follcv^/ing very urgent and top scorot

tolcgran to tho Gcman Logation in Bratislava (Ex. 183, Dco,B.4-B,p.93):
"With roforonco to today's tolephono oonvorsatim,

I bog to infom tho Slovak Govcrmnnt of idio following without
dolayj

*
4

'

According to the reports on hand Polish operations
against tho Slovak border nay bo cxpootod at any ttio. So as
to protect Slovakia against surprises, the Gornan Gcvcmiaont

requests tho Slovak Govcrrriont to agroo without delay
T.) that the Ceo .andor-ln-Chlof of •^ho Gcnaan Amy avciil
hl.isolf innodiatoly of tho Slovak Amy for tho protc stion
of Slovakia's northern bor.ior.

2.) that tho (wortiand r-in-Chiof of the Gornnn Air Forco'
nay use tho Zipsor-Noudcrf air field and, if nocoesary, bo
authorized to issue' a general ordor to tho Slovak Air Force,
forbidding all aircraft to take off.
In this connection I beg that it bo pointoi out that, in viovf
of possible ccnfliots with Poland and p;c-)Vidcd the Slovak
Govoririont grant us tho anticipated loyal co-operation,
wo should be willing,

1.) to safeguard tho frontier against Hungary,
2, ) to ."*1
the return of tho border territory, coded
to Poland in tho fall cf 1958 in tho ovcnt; of Poland waging
war against GorrAany,

37y~bo~gi/i^rthe assurance that in eavsc Poland should wage
war against Gomany, tho Slovak Amed Forces would not bn used
•utside

Slovakia.
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boR te anruiso that tho Slovak Gevnrmcnt give its ass'-int to

abovo--icutionod ncasigjros irxnndiatoly and -withOtUb loss of
Ploaso transi-ait tho pclitioal ocn]-.iUiiioaticns midor tiio seal of
s t r i c t confidence#

Having subr.iittcd the initial Wotos I request you to rofcr
tho Slovak Gevcrnrient to General Barkh.auscn fcr details

and in

particular also on aocount of the uso of Geri.ian aircraft fcr tho
protection of supply lines.

(signed) WCEEMAIL;",

(Underlining supplied)
These donands co^ld only be nado, because ViCERivuiNN' s suggestion cf

5 October 1938 for an independent and weak Slovakia "ivhioh v/ould lend the
best assistance for "Unc Gcrian need fcr advance and settling space in "the

East" (Ex#98, Doc,B,3-B, p.244/45) had bcconc a reality. New the nonont had
bone for Gornony to reap the fruits of WOBRMidC^'s far-sighted policy#
•5>

"VVQERM/iNN oorxionts on the. doour.iont as fcllov/s;

"It was obvious that in "this danger cf war something had to bo
done in ordir tc include Czoohcslovakia in the defense prograii

in aocordancQ with our trGa"by# This decunent shews that it was

not'a natter of offensive, but of defense neasurc". (^Tr.p.11136)

This is cxtro'iely ponrjfor vjOEHLtiiiH! knov/ quite "woll that there was no
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danger aC a Polish aggression'agains t Gortioihy^ "vvhcrcas Gcrmaiy

a.t

the peak of her preparations for th^ aggrcssiv.. v.ar against Poland (Ei^~
bdntrop'on the very saiie day oonduded the Lcs covv Pact), It "..as also on
the very sane day that IJOSRlvjilv'K transmitted Hitla:-'s Note to' Chafih ^arl

of 23 August 1939^ to the effect ttnt Gormar^y vjas ready for the confli^'^^j
to Ribbentrop in lies cow (Sch. -180^ Doc.-3ook 4-3j P» 83). No loss than.
tv70 .dajrs later, on 25 August, in the vords cf ..OjjRiuAi'iN-^s ov.n testimony

(tr. pp. 11133j 11520) "the Vfholv^ world knew that prospocts for peace had
dropped to practically zero", and "it looked as if war was incvLtaole".
>

In vLow cf the situation the tv© rcferaiccs in Sxh. 183 to "Poland's i-ag-

ing vjar against Gernany" vjor^ cLoarly nothing "out the woll-knov;n ana v/prn-

out diplomatic euphemism for the intoided Gcrjian aggression against Poland.
Ihreo days later, on 26 August 1939, when all tha world know; "liiat
Gornnny v/ae on the verge of an attad' against Poliind, ..'OjSRmA'IN had a ccn-

vorsation with the Slovakion Li.istor Cernak, a:)Out . hich he repor-t^^d in
I

a memorandum of the same day (3xh. 18?, Doc.-look 4-3, p. IO2).
"Ih^ Slcvai:ian minister has today coiiie to see me. He expressed
his satisfaction about the proiiiisos made by our Idrastv^r to the
Slovakian Government in case of a conflict viith Poland. Accord

ing to his instructions, iie also ask^d whethei Germany could not
pronrLso, in addition to the promises already made, "that, in case
of a conflict with Poland^ Slovakia VA:)\jld got tlie Slovakian ter
ritory tjhich Went to Poland in 1920 (parts of the Komitats Orawo
and Kipa). The s^}ime rcqijest of the SlovalcLan Governnonb was olroadj'-transmitted throu^ the ilinister at Bratislava.
I told Gornak that a decision was to be taken in this ror'

^oct. I could, so I said, imagLno that the Sio\akian d..;siro
Vtonld be received oy us with beixvDlence. Iho iiinisb-r gave mn

maps on the Slovaldian districts which went to Poland in 1920 and
1938.

( s igned) h'ocr nann."

The fact that the term "Poland's waging YJar again^ Gen..aiy" (iSxh, 18,
had changed into a "case of a conflict with Polaid" (Esh- 18?) shows that
the Slovaks had perfectly understood wl:Bt Gcriany had meait by tho forji^

term. As to the r^^st, bOiIl.a:N's Goirmont that G^ibit 187 "captained only
tho reaction of the i^iinister" (tr. p. 11136) is incompatiole "vith the se
cond pa^^agraph of tho docutent, which shcsws that •..OfiRlAi'^N encour-agsd the
Slovak Kinlstor in his additional territorial claims^

•

. .-^,39

^

:v

•V

• *

•• •

r' •*# "'••5

On 2S August 1939 ViOiiEEl^av'N v;rotc tho" folloYdng secret lieuioraidua

(Sxh. 3662, Doc.-3ook 99-A, p. 22):
"Legation Comcillor HoCnann callod ori the 27th o± Augiist^,
Zi^k5 hours, from Bratislava and inforniod us that I'2lnister
Bernard in the presence of General Barl-ciiaus^-n had handed ovca:'

th^ Note ordered by Instructions Pol. I 968 (top secret) to
the Slovakian Govarnmont. According to this

Note, Slo/akia

voluntarily placed her tcrx-itorv at our disoosjl for "thv. do-

ployment of Gcrfnan troops. The executive vduH fornally reniain

in the h^^nd5 cf Slovakia, thu Slovakian authorities Tvculd sta]'
in office; they waro, hov/cver, instructed to coaply vvitda all
demands of Ger-man military authorities. Fur'Chermtre, a nunbor

of additional detaa.L©d regulations vjero issued. The Slovakian
dabinet had accoptcd the GoT-t-^an reCjuests

after a a:>nference of

one hour and a half and only made one reservation "vd t-h refer-cnce

to point 6, according to vhich, in q:>ecial ceses
s> poi: sons of
non-German nationalitv may be tried oj Gvxr.an Military Coijr-bs
for offenses against me Gormanliohrmacht, etc..
The Slovakian reservation states that th-^ Slovakian Govern-

moat claims for itself tiie s.acie light, in CdS^ Slovf-ian troops
should at aiy ^ven tine be used on icic h territory, under thu
same car cumstancos;.

The 31(77akicaa Government intends -to inicfrm th e German le

gation on this rosarvation sirnfLtaneously mth the accoptancQ
of the other dei^nds on the mcrning of 26 August. Minister

Bornar-d asked for authority txe confirm receipt cf this Slovaician
Note, vdaich v^rould mjoan tint th.^ rescr-v^tion is accepted. General
Barkhausen has declared his approval for Army Corps lk»
I have authorized thv.- Legation to proceed accordingly. Substantivoly the ros^vation imans as mudi as nothing; by the way,
the Slovakian Govornmcnt has b^on assured that SlcvriKian troops
Y.'ill not bo used outside of Slovakia.

(typev/rittcn sigmt-uro) boeream."
(Underscoring supplied).
On cross-Gxar.h.nation •.vOEHIwS\;K had to admit that German troops a f^^vf

days later actually invaded Poland coming from Slov-akia (tr. p« 13519)Exhibits 1G3, 13? and 3662 prove that the defendant .vOSRl-aMN tcok a lead

ing part in this particular phas^ of the aggr^ssiv.. war- a£a3,nat Poland.

-
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On 26 Alignst 1939 "the Polish iifiibassadar lipski savj '.•iOMlAI\lT

lodged a series of complaints about border violations "vJhich ho" (Lipski)
"thought to bo of groat iiiiport", as VJ05HiJAI-IN stated in his neiflorandum

on the conversation (Exh. 185^ Doc--look 4—3^ P- 97)- The moniorandum then
continuGs;

"I promised that the inddonts ivould be invesligatodj and added
that vjo had a groat nurtber of serious complaints of a similar

nature/which would bo submitted b^ way of cur Enbassy in v^arsaw.
These German ccoplaLnts about alleged border inddonts vj^ro a few fiuys

later used by V;0EP1^3 in his attempt to put the responsibility for ttie

outbreak of war on Poland (Sch. 3660^ Doc.-3ook 99--ij p« 3^^/31 end Exh.
I

'

3665, ibid. p. 25j which will bo discussed later in this Secticn). itolo
in those two last-mentioned docum(3its la3d.rg the greatest enphasison

the border incidents, IjOEiduAlMP minimizos them in his di." ect examination;
"For tho rest, in such tense i.-toniaibiondL situations there have
always been frontier incidents. It was lilce that then, end it
is the same novn" (tr. p. 11132),

On 25 August 1939

on his own initiative (tr. p. 11133) soib

the follovjing circular telegram to a nuflber of Ger.ian missiors.in Gr^at

3ritain and Franco (Sch. ISA, Doc.-Book 4-3, p, 95):
"Ploas^ ad-viso all Hoich Germans to leave the country by iho
fastest available eieans."

On 28 August 1939 WOHU'-lANH sent another circular teLogranito Var
ious German missions abroad advising them that the Naval High Comiiand

had ordered all-German merchant ships to retur-n as quickly as possible

to home torritoiy (Exh. 190j Doc.-Book k~~3s P- 1^)*
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A few dcys after the outtreck of '.icr Gemr.ny issued a I/hite Book,
excerpts of which have been introduced in evidence both by the Prosecu

tion and the Defsnse^ The selection vjes r.iade by von Koltkec. the Gerir.n
i^nbassador in l/arsaw, and by von Schmiedeno c. subordinate of T/OSEl.UdiI>T5's

' in the Politiocl Division (tr.p.11523), the sane von Schmieden,T.7ho v^a.s

' a defense affiant in this trial and had the ta.sk of providing; the De
fense with doounents fron the Berlin Docunent Center, V<0SPd4£dTN hir.iself
was consulted in the course of the selection of the doounents for the

TtiHiito Book (ibid.) It -vi^s he who in a Circula.r Letter of 7 Septeriber 1939
sent out the Geman \/hit0 Book to the Gerna.n nisaioas abroad. This letter

of ITOERil/OT's, which is Ebc,3366, Doc. Book 99/i p.27,

is worth beinr

quoted extensively;

"The Gen-.icn T/hite Book' * Doounents concerning the lest phc.se
of the Gernan-pblish Crisis', which v/r s just published and
is enclosed herewith, contains the official doounents con
cerning the events that led to the present conflict and is
therefore to be used as the bc;sis

for all diacussicna of

this problen.
In order to facilitate the understc.nding of the'^^Jhite
Book' the following points will be explained in the follow
ing;
!• The Systen
,
2.

f>,;v

The Facts.

The Vhite Book aeeIs only with the incident directly
loading to the conflict. No conclusion should be dravm

fron this that this incident is of greater importance than
-£'

its deeper causes, v/hich are to be found in the Versailles
Treaty,, the i'o-opening of British oncircllng policies and tl'b©
intrmsigency of Poland connected with this and ihs aubaequent joining of the anti-Gerncn fronts In any discussion

•
)•'.

of the question of 'war guilt' the actual causes v;ill al-

\}c.ys have to bo considered first.
•'Tith regard to the incident leading up to the outbreak
of the ''ar as described in the 'j'hite Book the following
7/ill It£ ve to be stated;

a) ihglcnd's guilt.
The exohrngo of opinions botv/eeu Britain and Germc.ny up

to the Ist of September clearly reveals that, though the

British Governnont pretended to accept the generous ^ofI'or
of the Fuehrer, as far as its form was conoorned, mtli re

gard to the actucl air.tter it v;ra only anxious to delay

the neoossary decisions and v/ra eapocic lly not willing to
exercise any strong influence on the Polish Govornnent

(conpare especially the British luenorcnduii of 30 •'^-uguat,

enclosure 14 of the uhite Book).

If, on the other iia.nd, the British olcin^that the

British Governr-ient oculd not persuade Pole nd to clxnge

its attitude, because it did not knov/ the Ger.x n propo- ^

sels withregard to the settlonent of the probleii ox Danaig
tnd the CoVridor and of the minority question, it ...uat be
stated tlar.t the Gerr-ia-n nemorc.ndun of 29 Lugust addressed
to the British Governrient (onplosuro 12 of the Vhit© Book)

contained already the r.ia in contents of the Ger.icn de.ic.nda.
-

-

'/
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In addition to this, during the night of 31 iiugust, the
British i-nbassador vc>s linf^Dmed of the ^erimn suggestions
•which had been worked out in the nec.ntirxe, and tSey were
explained to hir.i in detail...,
^fter the 1st of ^eptenber, the British Govarnnents sabo

taging liussolini's suggestion openly revealed its decision
to bring about the general conflict
He '^emrns have to
point out this decisive British attitude v;ith specie 1 onphasis •

b) Poland's guilt,

Poland, to whon the blank endorsenent given her by the
V/estern Powers gave strong moral support, showed her definite
unwillingness to meet the Fuehrer's offer even half-ways
through the fact that no polish intermediaries arrived on
the 30th and 31st of-^ugust; ^ibassador LIPSKI's appearance

without any power to negotiate was no substitute. That, in ad
dition to'this, Vfarsaw wr.s going to force the conflict to

c head - overestimating thereby its own milito>ry strength,
but especially trying to use frivolously the coalition estab-

in favor o^ Poland fpr her
^fl'^gfe|ggt^^^§a"go^^o^il^:^^,y|hi'-s-efious-r:ord5r--in5iaonts

of the ]x. st decisive days (compare the I'uehrer speooh page 24,

last p. ragraph of the h'hito Book), especially, however, from
the announcement of the Polish general mobilisation of

30 "August (enclosure 31).

The Poles will have no excuse

that the ^eri-rn proposal had not been knoTvn in Harscv/ until

their publication through the German Radio (compere onclo-

suro 15). hith regard to this it must be stated that the
polish Government, which had already been informed via Lon

don as early as 30 /ugust about the ^errxn nemorandum of
29 fugust and thus knew about the main contents of the
lerr.ian demands, recri-ved inforixtion about the details of
the Gerrx.n proposals through the British during the forenoon

of the 31 -^ugust.
o) France's attitude.
The attitude of ranee during the last phc.so of the crisis
differs noticeably from that of the British. Especially the
favorable reaction tov/arda the Italian proposal to intervene,

which wr s ix.de on the End of 'September (enclosure 21) shows
that Francd rxde efforts to achieve a friendly compromise
even after hostilities had started in the Bast and that she

v/c,s only too weak to v/ithstand British pressure...,.*"
(Underscoring supplied)
This letter by the defendant WOER/ILNlvT is a brazen attempt not only
to justify the German aggression against Poland, but tlso to split up
Oreot Britain and France.

"Thus Frtnce's intervention is to be explained from a weak
ness only, but not from the endeavor to unloosen the general

conflict; this cannot be omphc.sized strongly enough on the
part of Genxny, v^hioh, at the same tiiie, I'ill also ha.ve to
emphasize the opposite attitude of Great Britain..,
i. aiiuilar attitude appears in HOERI'.'I/JRJ's telegram to-the German Em
bassy in Moscow of 3 September 1939 (Ex.3655, Doc,Book 99ji, beginning on

page 25, page 4 of translation).
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"After the ctteivipt of direct GerLien-Polish negotiation h&d rei.ic.inod T/ithout result beoc use of non-cppecrtnce of the polish

Plenipotentiary, the ^Grnc.n C-overn-uent had been v«:.iting for
2 dc.ya, and after vie had been forced to reply to Polish r.alitary 0:?ccesse5 by going over to uili.tary action, England and
France on 1 Septei.iber der.u nded fron us the recalling of Ger-

uan troops frqr.i Polish territory.,.,.

Repsonabie Geri-if nrPolish settlenpnt vfpuld have been
aqhiei/Tod long ago v/ithqut Britaininterference and her antiGornan encircling policy. Instead of advising Poland to take
a D.ore conciliatory attitude Great Britain gave her a blanket
power of attorney against Gernany, brought herself into a state

of dependency on Poland's decisions and finally in the last.
r.ior.ient by her attitude even condemned Mussolini's proposal to
failure. Thus the seeds of those non in England have borne
fruits v/ho have boon preaching for years the destruction of

Gernany^ This sequence of events shows quite clearly the full
responsibility of -England for the outbreak of war.
(typewritten signature) '/Dcma.nn,"

(Underscoring supplied).
The purpose of this telegranwrs, as y/OERMAinT confiraed in his cross-

Gxa.nination (tr,p, 1152S/3). to servo as official guidance for the Geman
Eribassy in Moscov/ in their conversations . That the contents had not only
nothing to do with the true facts, but that TVOEPl,!/!® hiriself did not be
lieve in then, is shoim by the follov/ing passage in h'OSRMAlUT's cross-

oxanina. tion (tr .p .11522 );
"Q, In your opinion at that tine what nation or group of nations
was responsible for the outbreak of this vmr?

A« According to ny inncrnost convicirion \ I held the opinion

that a gfoat part was to bo attributed to Hitler, but
not the exclusive responsibility."
In this connoction it nry also bo pointed out that ITOERMANIT knew
,frou Brdna.nnsdorff's telegran of 29 August 1939, v^hioh shov/s hin on the

distribution List (Ex,19i; Doo.Book 43 p.Ill) that England and Fra-nce
had been putting pressure on Pola nd to ontor nobOtiations with Geri'.i£.ny

on the basis of ^"^itler's speech of April ,1939.
Ano-Hhor part of the sane docui^ont Ex.5S65 shows MOBWikMin a sinilar

strain. It is his circular let+er of 11 Septenber 1939 (Ex.3665, Doc,Book
99a, beginning on page 25, pp.2/3 of the ti^aiialation);. ^
"The warlike events in Poland, aa is well knov/n, were not the
result of a Declaration of •<ar ""by ono or the other side, but
were induced by the fact that -fahe situation resonbling, civil
v/a.r which had been existing foT the past i.ionths along the
Eastern frontier of the Reich had gradually developed into

open "attacks on Reich territon-y so that tho Gerna n Govornaent v/cs forced to put a stop to those continuous rnd for a
Groat power intolerable thrc^ats, by those aef.ns v/hich alone

v/ere left to hor to defend the peaco, the security end the
-

•

...
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honor of -bhe Gen.icn Re|.ch.-^.. Th© Fuehrer's speech of

I oepteiibor did not iiention ony Oemt.n-Folish hrr,^ but
ovoided t h i s , . , . . ,

Tho i :ip ortc.nt point for ^i! ia net to clacr up th^s contre^rersy re^c.rdii\_ the otg"!; 3 of ".fc r, but to piece tho respon

sibility fp.r the outbroc.): of the confllLct vTith the other
sldeT^

'

The defendant "i/OFHiiUir onnflrned. in his cross-exeninetion thet this

circular letter wr.s sent out in acooi'denoe v/ith the responsibility of the

foliticc.1 Division to furnish politiool

'tho G-ernan nissions

c.brocd (tr.,p.11523).
That WOERI.'UxNN knov/ tho rec.l ainip of the ^eriiO-n aggression is shown

by Ex,2121 (Doc.Book 54^ P'4), Tjhero ho states in a telogrc.i.1 to tho
Gernc.n F^ibcssy c.t tho Vctioc.n of 13 *^ctobor 1939:

"Tosen will in futuro undo ubtodly fori.i part of the Gerrian
Reich,"

•LStor tho end of the

Polish c^.tipcign^ Hitler, rn 6 October 1.939, rx;

do a so-called peace offer to tho './'^jstorn powers, hith regard to this
peace offer the dofondant '(/OERI.™! JJent on 13 October 1939 the follo

wing instructions by circular tologMrri tc r nuribor of Geriifn iiisaions

abroad (Ex,3667, -^oo.Hook 99li p,34)t
"The Finnish foreign Minis tor has requested out Minister at
Helsinki to iriforu hi:.i ba^foro his departure for Stookholia
for the liCeting of tho H^cda of tho Sorndlneavic.n States
whether my solutions for ending tho jc r cculd be suggested
fron Gor:ir.n side,

Thereupon the LegEti>ra at

elsinki roceivoii. the follov/ing

telogrc.Ji froii the Reich Jforeign Illnister:
I request you to stato in reply to the question of the Fin

nish -^oralgn Rinlster thtr.t Mr.Chr. iber Ir in has rejected in the
•jost ahfiioless :u:.nner tli*o I'uehrer'""s generous pern e offer and
SlEjl _the iiatte'iirs^ new ol^^scd ?.s TaVTV T7o~re con"VVfnQd7

I request you nVt^ivo rn7~furthor oxplcnatiTnJTn theTTatter,
Hnd of instructims to Helsl--J-i, Request that if necessary

you use siiMlcr language there

(typowrittoTr sigiicture)
(Underscoring supplied.
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4.

Scandinavia.

The defendant '/iJOEiR!iANN claims that during the period
preceding the attack on Denmark and Norway, i.e- from
29 March until d April 1940> he was on leave in Feldafing

in Upper Favaria (tr.p.11159). This is supported by the
affidavit of

von Rintelen, Woermann Fx. 54, '^oermann

Document B'OOV: 4 p. 38 and by'a c^on copy.of ^oermann*s Order
of 28 March 1940, Woermann Ex. 55, Woermann Doc.Book 4 p.40.
TiOERMANN states that he _returned to Berlin in the lete after

noon -of April 8, that he went to see Weissaecker at his home
on the same day and was informed by him "that this Norway
business w^s imminent" (tr.p.11190).
On the same day, 8 April, WOERMAFN had a conversation
with Zarabonl, Councillor of the Italian Embassy, which he

recorded in the following memorandum (^x.216, Doc.Bool: 5
p.79):

"Botschaftsrat Zamboni, evidentlv without any

orders from Rome, today mentioned to me the,^
T'nglish operations against Norway and in this
connection referred in a discreet form to the
rumors circulating about German military ^

operations. 1 denied these. Signer Zamboni
urgently requested me to keep the Italian
Embassy currently informed about the Norwegian
affair."

(signed) Woermann.

WOEHO.KE claims that he gathered from an Italian book,

which mentioned this conversation, that it toor place in the

evening (tr.11191). The Prosecution has introduced the re
spective excerpt from the book by Lanza, alias Si oni
"Berlin, Italian Embassy, 1939-1943" as "x.C-360. Doc.Book

215A p.75 to show that It gives no Indication of the time
of day, when the conversation with Zamboni took place.
u

WOERKAKIT ctates that he does not rocolloot,if ho saw Zmmboni
before or after weizsaookcr had informed him about the im

pending invasion of rerway (tr.p.11192), I'vit it Is only natu
ral that he saw his Chief von Wcizsaookor first, after return

ing from leave, before entering Into conversations with, and

••-•v.;,

»

I'l., ••V:'-"

making important statpmontp to foreign diplomats. If, as
TfOEEij.Kl' claims,
conversation with ^amboni took pinqe
in the ovoning, this acquoneo of events is even more likely,
But in addition VfOERTAMF himpcif admits?
the Pf OS ccp-t i on has already charged
with lying
foreign dip^pinatg,
i'^had"krown o.f the Forway entorpriso at that

point, I could and would not havo wanted to
give the Italian anv information about it.
^

(ib.id.)

TThat WOERICAEF actually did was not ro.fusinri .to givo

information, but tolling.the Italian Fmbass^ Counolllor a
t

•direct

lie, in so far as he denied rumors about ,t . i man

military operations, though he positively know them to b.o
I

impending. And finallyi while pleading bad rocolioction .on

direct testimony in the morning of 7 July 1948 (tr.p.11192),
"^OEraiANF had apparently forgott n this convenient dofonso

during the afternoon session of the same day, when, in the
course of his discussion of another document, he suddenly

oamo out with the surprising admission (tr.p•11228)!
"I was able to stick strictly to the truth in

this instance, something that I was certainly

not able to do in some diplomatic convorsations,

as I have explained this morning, during, the

conversrtion with the Italiar Ambassador when

discussing the Norwegian affair."

/I
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BFimiUX

COUNTRIES.

German preparations for the invasion o

the Benelux

countries started already two months ^fter the German attack
against Poland. Already in the first half pf l^ovember 1939
WO-iRIviAFN got official knowledge of definite German prepera-

tions for an attack through

von Buelow-Schwante^s telegram,

Fx. 243, Doc.Book 6 p.17, which, as he admitted- (tr.p.11203),
was brought to his attention. Since that date 70''RFAF:',
Weissaecker,

Ribbentrop and the defendant Schellenberg pre

pared in complete teamwork the aggression'against the Benelux
countries.

During the same month the Dutch Government c.omplained
about violation of -Holland's neutrality through the crossing
of her territory by German aircraft. WOFRMAl'TK states that his

Political Division submittod two drafts for

o reply through

Ribbentrop to Hitler, which wore both rejected (tr.p.11550) ♦
Hitler's final decision, which Hev/ol,

the

liaison between

Hitler and Ribbentrop, -trnnsmitted to "fODR-WH" on 22 i^ovember
1939 (Dx. 3668, Doc.Book 99A p.36) wns the follo\ving:
"1. In future, all flights by German aircraft over
neutral territory will be denied, unless they

can bo proved beyond doubt, e.g. through crash
or parts of the aircraft, which aro found, etc.
2. If any such flights can be clearly proven to
have taken place, a decis.ion will have to be
mads in each individual case as to whet Is- to

'f

bo

done .

3. The Reich !'inister r.quests State Sccretarv
'TOER-ANN to submit to hin es soon as possible

an exact list of flights over Holland and

Belgium by German aircraft and a list of
flights over these countries by onomy aircraft."
With

reference to this document Woormann stated on cnoss.

examination;

"The practice that prevailed vfas that the Reich
Aviation Ministry .was requested to inform us con
cerning the information which wc were to pass on
to foreign diplomats in regard to flights ovor
foreign territory ... But I am sure that the prac
tice that prevailed was probably guided in conform-

it;^ wit% Hitler's directives." (tr.p. 11527)

On 13 January 1940, WOERk'ArH submitted bhr following

momor andum to "^'elEsaeckor ( Dx .246, Doc.aook 4^ p•3S) t
- 4® ***
h\Vh,.

"Thf; Bolginn A^ibassedor told mo to-day that ho
wants to cnll on the State Socrctary in the

question of the continued instances of flights
of German aircraft over Belgian territory. In
particular ho criticised that vfo had left former
complaints unansv/cred, v/hich places him in a
difficult position towards his Government.
Also Councillor of Embassy Count Berrycr

spoke to me ropeatedly about th^-^so flight's over

Belgian territory, v/hich, he says> continued up
to the last days.

The Luftwaffe Operational Staff has boon re

quested to givo us a plausible explanation for
Belgian consumption."
W0ERI.1AFN was not intorostc-d in. obtaining a report on tho

true facts, but one that would sound plausiblo for Belgian

consumption, and in this sense he also commented on the do
cument (tr.p.11207):
"I think it is
where th'^t i f

quite normal and customary every
one wants to

hand

a Fotc to the

onomy side about it, they Bhould got an nxplanation that sounds plausible to them."

The main flaw in this argumentation is that Belgium was

no enemy, but a neutral country, v/hoso intogritv and invio

lability Germany had repeatedly guaranteed (Ex. 236, 237, 238,
Doc.Book 6 pp'.2,4,S).

At the same time, WO-.Rl[ANlf was officially informed about
the Mccheln incident (Ex.247, Doc.Book 6 p.26), which gave him

"a pretty strong hint" of an irapendine; attack agaipst Belgium
and Holland (tr . p . 11200) . H-c talked "quite openly" with the
Bolginn Ambassador Count Do.vignon about the incident (ibid.). •
"There were also other indications which in fact

made, it lik^'ly that an "•ttack on Trance wa.s being

discussed through Belgium and Holland" (tr . p• 11200/l),

"MjII, that was a funny thing in tho situation at
the time. In contrast to the ITqrway enterprise, there

nobody had cv.,n discussed it before, while with
respect to an imminent attack on Belgium, s the
Belgian A.mbassador says here, nver*''one was talking
about it in tho streets." (tr.p.11201)»

WOERMAFH was also officially :}.nformod about tho Venlo

incident (Ex.248, Doc.Book 6 p.36, 38 and tr.p.11205). Ribbentrop gavG at that time instructions' to all Foreign Office

officials, including WOERKANH, that inquiries from the Dutch
Government were to be answered to tho. effect that the case had

not yot been cleared up (tr,p.11205).
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In accordnncG with those instructions

von Rintclrn,

Special Referent for Belgium and Holland in the Politiccl

Division, and a subordinrto of the defendant 'HOEmiAVV^ kqpt
putting the Dutch Government off althouKh they" continued to

press him (Gaus Affidavit, ^:x, 254 ff 4, Doc.Book 6 p,68). The
affiant Gaus adds that he beliuvcs that von Rintelcn must

have discussed this matter with his immcdipt- superior
'.•I OERMAri ( ii)id . p . 68/69) . Other evidence shows that there was
no

s c or c t - a,b out

it.

'.HOERMAHK himself admits tha.t he was

of

ficially informed of Ribbentrop*s instructions for dilatory
treatment of the Von 1 o -n.f f a ir (t r . p . 11 205 ) , and Ex.248

(Doc.Book 6 p.38) shov/s that Toissaockcr informed him on
f

18 larch 1940 of his "stereotyped negative reply" to the Dutch
Mini s t e r .

As early as January 1940 Ribbentrop ordered von Schmiedon,
a subordinate of "VOERMAhF, to collect all material in the

Dutch and Belgian press that adopted an un-noutral or hostile
attitude against Germany (Gaus Affidavit, Ex.254,

5

Doc.Book 6 p.69). Gaus assumes that ^IfOrRr-T'-FH know of the
Schmiedon reports,- since von Schmiedon made no secret of his
assignment (ibid.),- and von^ S c hmi odcn himself in his Defense

Affidavit states th<at he probably spoko with "TOSETkA-FN about

it (fforrnvann Ex. 60, Woermann Doc.Book 4 p.50a).
About

oar-ly ^-^arch 1940, Ribbentrop instructed v6n Rinte

lcn, the Referent for
Division,

Bolgium and Holland in tho Political

to record all instances,

in which British .pianos

attacking Germany flov; over Dutch t err itory.|and make thorn
a

tho sub,icct of/formal Note of Protest. IV.nv such Fotes were
sent to the Dutch Govornmont (.Affidavit Gaus, Ex. 254

9,

Doh.Book 6 p.70). This v/as not a "special assignment" and
tho Fote.s and memoranda wore made out through tho normal
channels of the Political Division (Gaus on cross-examination

tr.p.4848/9), .T0 quote further from Gnus *s affidavit

(ibi :,p.70) :
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^t'

"•The

c.for ^^cntioned fr.cts v/orc ossonti-lly

knov/n to

r l l tho

lor.ding

gfficir.ls

Gorm-^n Foreign Office- FfPi^

of tho

r Gmomtr r.nc os

I r.m quite cortcin thr.t %o^asfipckor r.nd
WCERIIAFN

wore

r.t

thr.t

time

awr.ro' of whht 'had

transpired in -thp Foreign pffice during this

•'M

period- Tho facts^ whon considcrod together,
created the impression among all of us that
thoy v/cro related to preparations for tho
imminont invasion of Fclgium, Holland, Luxcm-'
bourg. Further, it xvas clearly evident that
Ribbontrop was collecting m'^tori-'-l against

L'f'*

those countries,

such as tho Schmicdcn pros's

reports, tho sn and OF''*'" reports, the protests
agains.t British flights, etc. in order to pro

vide justification for such an invasion."
Gaus further states in his affidavit (ex.254. Doc.Book

M

6 p.72) that he believes th-^t Ribbontrop left Berlin on tho
day of the inva.sion, 10 I'ay 1940, "nd a'ddsJ
"I believe that it would h^vc boon impossible
for Ribbe-ntrop to have loft tho Foreign Office
at this critical period without informing
Wcissaecker -"s the State Secretary and a.s his
deputy a.s to what ho desired to be done. •Since

immediate coordinated action v;as necessary on the
date of the invasion, in my opinion it is reason
able and probable thr^t yri iz saockor in turn in
formed vvOERMANF what steps v/ora to bo taken by

the officials of his Political Departmont."

On the morning of the invasion, "rO'-RllAFN was ordered to

i;

appear at 5 o'clock at the Foreign Office and to hold himself

#•

available for a c onvor s at 1on 7/ith tho Luxembourg Charge' d*Af-

fa.lrcs (tr.p. 11209). Ribbontrop recoivod tho Belgian Ambassador
and the Dutch ll^inistor and handed thcra the Foreign Offlcrj
9

.

V

memorandum trying to. justify tho aggression. Ho origina.lly

also intended to recciv. t>io Luxembourg Chargrf d'Affaires, but
actually loft this to 'TOFRrAFlT, According to .his rrwn statement

WOERLALL handed the memorandum to the Luxembourg Charge"' d*/ffalFos about 8 a.m., after he h'-d made sure that Ribbontrop

would not recolve the latter (tr.p. 11209/10.) The attack had '
^'...,>r

#•
tr'

begun earlier in the morning (ibid.)

On L6 May 1940 WGERMARN rooeivod tho Luxembourg Charge^
d^'Affaircs again and told him

"that wo now considered Luxembourg an onomy coantry
and therefore he would have to lonvo," (Ex.3669,

Doo.Book 99A P'S^).
— 5-^

I

I...

il'i(i-..>inillLlA-Tthri ilil'htflUt ilri

5^/

the

As to/invr.sion of ^•olgium, wc -"Irnw the Tribun'\l's
attention to Ex.G-391, Section 1,1, Doc.Book 206 p.14,
whoro 7;0ERL1AKH in Januarv 1942 suggests

annexation of the

Belgian Congo.

^

-

';dmy

6.

3^.1k".n3

i)

Grocco.

On 20 -f^LLSUst 1940 k"02HI-.Ij'U:M rocjivod tho Grook ninisfcjr^ T/ho
inforra.ed hifii th''-b tho Grook PrinG Hinisfcor Gxpocfcod nn iiri'iGdiofco

Itnlxon invosionj porhops for tho v-jvy next di5'"»

•'•ho Grook o-ovornraonb

hnd done ovorybhing bo nvoid n conflicb ivibh Ibnlj^; ib hxd, in porbiculorj
rofroinod from nny nobilisobion nonsuros^ to o.void giving Ibnlj^ -.ny
protoxb for nn xttnck.

"In this difficult sibuxtionj tho Grook Govorni'iont roquosbod
tho ndvicc of tho ^orro^n '"^ovorniionb 0 I bold tho i-inistor
that I did nob undorstnnd precisoly nhnb kind of ndvico

wns Gxpocbod of Us. ^ho iiinistor bhon couched his roquosb
in more prociso terms^ sbxting th-'.b it y;xs perhops nob

mittcr of odvicc^ but rxthor of information ns to It.oly s
pi ins xs for OS'Grooco vn.s concernod. I bold tho kinistor
thnb I porsonolly did not believe Iboly's intentions

bownrds Grcoco it the time to be aggressive. ^Thq uinisbor

then xskod if it Vvould not bo possible forhim to spook

to tho -^eich Ilinistor for Foroi^ Affnirs in porson_, os his

Governnonb oxpocted n bclogrophic report from him bhxt do.y.
I replied bhxb the -heich I-Onisber for Foreign Affnirs v;ns
out of Berlin nb tho tim.o, bub thnb X would report the

conversation bo him." (ibc,266j Doc.Book 7^^ p.lV/l^)*
On 21 August 1940

hibbonbrop insbrucbod kOSEd.lAdi to pursue n

del-nying policy'- in his deelings with the Greek Ilinistor, xs shown by

ViOIEIA'iMj ' s momornndum of 24 August 1940 (ibid.p.18/19>) <

"During the enrly hours of this morning, the Greek minister
made dcsporabo efforts to reach *the hj^Lch minister for
Foreign Affairs through the Office of the Linister, On
being informed that tho h-oich kinistor for Foreign 'Affairs

was at present on a journey bo Southern Germany, bub that^
it night be possible to reach him by telephone in tho train
at 02,08 hours, ho visited no at 01,45 hours. He asked
mo to put the call through from my flat, a request Yjhich
I refused. I did, however, undertake to transmit a report
from tho ilinistor bo tho Hoj_ch minister for Foreign

Viffairs, in the brain.

.

The Ilinistor made the following statement: ^i.Iinister
President IIETIiXAS had telephoned him between midnight
'-^nd 01.00 hours this morning -nd had informed/lim that
the tiireat to Greece constituted by the bringing up

of Itali-'n troops to the Greek frontier had reached
such proportions that he was compollod bo order
immediate mobilisation.

He had induced kkT.'XIS to post

pone tho decision until he, the Kinisber, had spoken to
the Reich Piinisber for Foreign Affairs,

I-STaX.S had boon

of the opinion that it v/ouid bo possible to postpone the
decision for a short period only. His present demardie
-

:.4-, . .. . .

"DA

h-'^.ving produced no effect^ the Minister ngain requested
that any inforimtion which w§ my have on Italian
intentions be cominunica.ted to hLti,

As stated above_,

he asked lae to telephone the j^oich liinistor for Foreign
Affairs immediately#

I held out no hope that I should bo successful,
at that time of the nighty in putting through a call
to the ^eich Minister for Foreign Affairs and in getting

him to express an opinion. At 02.OS hours, during -a
ha.lt' at Hof, I informed Herr GOTTFHXiiDSS^ of the fa.cts
by telephone, adding that there was no'necessity to waken
the ^"^cich Liinister for Foreign .'iffairs, but that ho Tvas
to be informed early in the morxiing. Iho Greek Minister
was then informed, on ny instructions, that I had not
succeeded in contacting the H-eich Minister for Foreign
Affairs en route, but had sent the report of our
conversation bo him.

In accordance with instructions issued by the ^^eich
liinistor for Foreign affairs on 21 ^^ugust, I shall
continue bo pursue a policy of procrastination in my
dealings vdbh the Greek Minister on this sub.lect.

~

^ ^

(signed)

(Underscoring provided).
VDERililN N comments that there was a certain tension in Greek--

Italian rol.ations, bub that in "ugust 1940 the question of Italian

intentions on Greece was, according to his belief, not acute (tr.p,
\

11214).

'

•

Though it may bq bruo that at that £imo Greek fears wore
oxaggeratcd, the fact remains that

N's cool and deliberately

procrastinating attitude must have made it abundantly clear to Greece
that she could not count on Germany to restrain Italy from

unprovoked attack.
A month later, on 25 Sopbejubor 1940,

again received

the Greek Minister,

"The Greek iiinisber visited me today.

He attempted,

without official orders, to find out something about
the results of tho conforonco in Rome.

I told him that I, myself, had roueived no inform

ation.

He expressed his concern that Greece had been

discussed there and renewed his .assurances that all

k

reports of an unneutral attitude on the part of Gr'eeco
wore falso.».*»*

^

•

j

X bold the llinisber that wo constantly received

reports that Greoco had been giving assistance to
Skigland •

.

,

.

i

»

Tho Minister was quite downcast when ho left me,"

(Ex;,2,67, Doc .Book 7A p.20).
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In his direct testiinony VrOSaiiAIi^I specified the charge against

Greece bo the effect that she was using her merchant shipping

tonnage in a one—sided rf^nner and exclusively in favor of inglandj
and added that at that time nothing was kno^vn bo Germany about the

presence of British military units on Greek territory (tr.p,112l6)»
kf

• On 8 October 1940 VJOSEl^^iAJ-IN told the Yugoslav liinister nnd the

Japanese and Xtralion Smb-assy Secretaries that upon Rumanian reQuest^

German, troops would be sent to Rumania_, but only for the purpose

of instruction. (Sx.278j Doc.Book 71 p.52).
On 25 October 1940 WOSRIi'iAI'IN was officially informed through
a telegram from von .-t^^hcnscii

Rome^ tha.t the Italian operation

against Greece would start a.t the weekend (2x.268^ Doc .Book 71 p.21;
Woermnn on Distribution List).

UOERIliNK

stated

himself that it was possible that similar information was already
received a few days before from other sources, for instance from
the German I^inisbcr in Albania
{]-

On 26 October 1940

(tr.p.ll2l6)'.

VJOERIdllN's Soction Pol.IV sent

1*1 '^f
K'

"ex officio" a tcslcgram over Hcizsaccker^s signature to the
Gorman Minister in Athens,

requesting him

"to use bho greatest restraint in conversations
and particularly when giving advice in matters

concerning the Groek-Ibalian relations."
(Sxh.268, Doc.Book 71 p.22).

Germany wanted to avoid under all circumst<ances that Greece

should be warned of the impending attack.

%o days later, on 28

October 19A0, the Italian attack stp.rted,

The evidence clearly shows

that IXJiiRIwiJ'JN as Chief

of the

Polxticcal division was kept informed about all stages of preparation
of the German attack on Greece.
^

Ho admits knowledge of Sx.271, 272,

r

279, 283, 290, all in Doc .Book 71, (br.p.11220) acd Ex.299, Doc .Book
7B p.ll (br.p,11222), and we find him on the distribution lists of

Ex.269,270,273,280,285,286,289, in Doc,Book 71, and Sx.296, 304,
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305^ 306, 309, 310, 311 in ^oc.Book 7B, while Sic. 307, Doc,Book 7B
p.57 bears his initials.

On 15 January 19A1

the defendant von Steengracht, on j^bben-

tropes order, sent a memorandiun by the Rumanian 'General -^ntoneacii
to Heizsaecker with the request to discuss it, among others, v^ith

the defendant uOSKiiHH (5bc.294i DociBook 7A p.92). The meraorandum
stated

a.o,:

"I, Rumania today represents for ^ormony a strategiccenter and a base for the political hegemony in
Eastern and Southeastern Europe,

In the development of the diplomatic -^nd military
events in spring Rumani.a can become i center of the
militrary operations* Rumania.,is prepared to

' collabor.ate closely with lermany,
Rumania joined the Three Power Pact with this

object; it permitted the entry of '^ermm troops into
its territory, by making

joining the Pact an

effocb5.ve reality,

on

Rumania is prepared to start military operations
s side
if this should become necessary,

a.

Rumania will form the left defensive fLank in

case of an eventual operation towards ^outh,..."

The lost paragraph of the quotation clearly refutes V/OSRi-iI^N 's
contention that Ex, 294 had nothing to do with Greece, (tr.p-11218),
On the other hand, he admits that he gathered not only from this
passage, but also from other documcsits that German assistance of

Italy in her campaign against Greece was considered. (tr,p.ll220),
VJOERMiVM further admits that he knew of Hitler's decision of

•?-

31 J-onuoxy 194L that Operation Marita was to start at the beginning
of ^-^pril and that certain Non-aggression Pacts were to be prepared

to restrict the theater of operations (tr,p,11223, Ex,300,Doc,Book
\

-.I'ai

7B p,26, initialed by VJOERI'-^VIJN ), VJOERMfUIN also admits knowledge

I •'

of the top secret OKI'f Order

of 14 February 1941 setting the

timetable for the military preparations for the attack starting

t/v; ••

from Bulgaria (tr,p.11224, Ex,303, Doc.Book 7B p,46, initialed
by VJOSRlvIANU) .
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On 12 March 1941^ WOZIRIdANI'J reports again cabout lies which

he told the Itn.lian Charge'' d^Affaires (3x,308,Doc,Book 7B p.60):

"For some time no\ij the Italian Gjiarg^ d'.'^faires,
in his careful and groping manner, repea.bedly brings
up the question as to whether any action was in progress
or was intended which would force Greece bo capitulate#
7

Cosmelli seemed to consider the ?.nsvjer which I gave him

several days ago, th?.t I had heard nothing of the sort,
as somewhat indefinite information; thus he again brought

up the matter today, I told him quite definitely today
that nothing of the sort was in progress,."

There cannot be .any doubt that the 'German action "which would
force Greece to capitul.ate" was a German military invasion of
Greece, which

Icnew was scheduled for -"^pril.

is unable to follow vTOHRi-jlNI-ns

Ihe Prosecution

hairsplitting atteirpt bo draw a

distinction between the two terms, in order to make his infornRtion

to the Italian Charge d'Aff-aires appear to be true (tr,p,11228),

i.
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b) Jugoslavia.
//OiirHiAtjl' statos that Hitler on 27 or 2S ferch 19A1 -c^ads^ his decision

to attack Yugoslavia (tr. p, 11225). 'iith rogar-d to i±ie i±ue vjhen he re
ceived knowledge of the imniinent attack, the dei>3:idarfb lOSRuAMT is remark
ably vague.

"I cannot say any inorc than "that between the v<xy last days of
tiarch and the 5th of Apiil 1 received knovj-ledgo that an attack
upon Yugoslavia was inuninQit. I
(tr. p. 11226/7).

did not play any part in this

Vjhercupon vjQSPlIAi^ i'i's Defense Cours eL reaarkedJ

"^'Jc raust bo satisfioi "vith those inexactitudes," (tr, p, 11227),

To the P3^ seaiih.on 1.0i)Pi]hAI'>iI-' s stat^jmonb seoms quite

^isfactory,

and there is no reason why his reeitcry diould bo so faulty on such an irapor-^

tant point as the Yugoslav aggression, v#hich developed vith such dramatic
suddenness, and must have deeply iirpr^ssc-d anybody who v,'as in any way con
nected with those ovcnt-s. The reason for nOPKlAiCY'S roLiarkable lack of me

mory is obviously the fact that his policy influcncinqprcsposaL cf 29 march
1941 (Sxh, 316, Doc-3ook 7-3j p- 83) shows his partidpation in the diplo
matic preparation of the aggression. YOjfii, .ill; naturally hesitates to admit

that he knew of th^ Lap'Ending mivasion at this early date. ''iDEEmiKK's po

litical suggestions, submitted- through h'eizsaockor to ^bbcntrop, road as
follows;

"The Yugoslav liinister today asked by tolophone to be received

£-

by the Reich Foreign I'inistcr, the State Secretary or by me. Ho
stated as reason that his lovoriaucn t had called him to ^dgrado

for oral report and that ho would depart this afternoon at 18,00
hours,

xis I presume that ho is not to be received, I would ask fcr
instructions whether I can ansv;er the ionistur that ho camot be

rocoivwd in vlow of the Japaiaos^ guests. The answer would then "ix;
given only shcrtly before his dopax-turo."
The question is: w'hy did YOFRioail' piosu.ee tliat th^ Yugoslav Ldnistcjr
•^'as

not to bo received?

YOEHuiACk docs not like to give the obvious answer;

because ho know that an attack on Yugoslavia was in the stage of fr-oparation, but crofvirs to ovado tho issuci
"VJell, I don't know why I Jiadc th o assumption, which is contained

in this document, that the llinis oer w.gg not to be received. Perhaps
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^

I saw the td.egram pro-viously niontd.cn ed^ ibdiibit 315^ aircady^ <x- pcorhaps Itibbsi ti-op had is sit d a ^Edfic instruciion. I
at the'

cannot say dth certainty v?hether I know already
tinE ttatan attack upon Yugoslavia wag iiimiinenb."

(Tr. p» 11226, underscoring supplied)-

Exhibit 315 (Doc--3ook 1-^, p. 82)j to which

refers hero,

is a tsbLogian frora von RintdLoi to th^ Gcrrnan I'diiistor in Selgrade cf
tho samo day, 29 l-^rch 194^, transmitting Ribbcntrop's ardor tiiat the
Gorman J.iLnis"h:r should excuse himself from all afficial

functions on

tho pretext of being ill, vd.thout sending a roprosentative.

"A rcprosontativG is to bo sent only if the Tugoslav Governmcnt asks you to rocoivo official information, and in ord^r

'

to uphold this fiction of being ill, you are unable to coni-

ply wiih this request."
f

*•

'vTocrmann adrdts that he saw tiiis document (tr. p. 11225), and
everyone who, like eOSEI-'IAIlk, kncv; Ribbcntrop's technique of proparipg an aggression, must liavw known vhat it raeant. 3ut here again,
hesitates to adndt the obvious o,ni prefers shilly-shallying.

"I repeat, vhat I thought whoi 1 saw this at the time 1 do not

^

knovT na^ any raore
it is quite possiblo that Ribocn—
tirop's instruction was already a result of those intentions
of Hitler's. I believe that I mys^^lf learned of those inten
tions of Hitler's in the early days of April. I v/as not able
to reconstruct all thv.. details of those times exactly."

(tr. p. 11225).

It may bo pointed out that this statement is partly contradicted
by ViOEEil-HlCs later statornent on page 11226 of the traiscript, which
has boon quoted above,

ViOillijAHi'4 admits that ho knew von Rintdon's telegram of 1 April

1941 (Exh. 317, Doc.-3ook 7-3, p. 85), which oontcD.ned the information
that the defendant Voeseniraycr vjas on his way to Zagreb as Ribbontrop's

"confidential agent", he l-novir of his arrival there (Sxh. 318, Doc,-Book
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7-3, p.

mth

cn tho di'stribiition list, ssi also tr. p..

11227), and afterwards ho was kept officiaLlj' infor-food of Va. Sv^miayor's
activitios In Zagreb (Ejdii 325> Doc,-3ook 7—B, p. 100 and ibdi. 0-374^

0-375, C-376, C-377, C-37S, 0-379j C-3S1, 0-382, 0-384, all in Doc.-3cok

208, sealed iiiattcrs with

dieckoo. on the distiibution lists).

Exli. C-339-, Doc^-3ook 206, pi 9 shows that eDjiaiUNN was offi cially in

formed ox von Papon^s telegram of 1 jipril 1941, which contained a refercnco to the forthcoming attack against Yugoslavia (the document is
iioormann's copy). '.•iCSRiilNN is further found on the distribution lists

of Pkh. 312, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, and 329, in Doc.-3ook 7-3.
On 5 April 1941, the eve of the invasicn,

had a confiden

tial conversation v;ith the Italian Snbassy Councillor Zamboni about a

discussion bwtiveon the Yugoslav ilinistor in Berlin and the Italian aCK
bassador .YLficri of 4 ^pril showing Yugoslavia's wi31.ingacss to nego

tiate (Exh. 326, Doc.-Book 7—3, P« ICS)- But as
Was alroadj^ too late (tr. p. 11229).

-
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states, this

Esh, 3671, Doc.-3ook 99-A, p. AS shews that during die we3k follow

ing the invasion the question of the leads:'ship of the Croats and of the
setting up oE: a Croat Legion were Imndlod by vjCERilil#!'s Political Division
(soG L'ooritiann's cross—eKaniination tr* p* 11531)*

Firelly, it was

who, in a letter of 12 ^ril 1941, suggesi>-

ed to Ribbentrop that Slovakia should recognize the puppet State of Croa
tia as soon as Gca-niany and Italy would have done so. Ribbentrop accepted

this suggestion, and von Rintoloa on 14 ^pril notified s.OjSRl/iAkiv of Rib

bontrop's decision (Exh. 3672, Doci—3ook 99—^, P* 52, tri p^ 11532)*
i

Afew months after the invasion of Yugoslavia, on 11 July 1941,

VJDEREiAM sent a tolegrarrL to the German Legation in Bucharest mth the
following instructions (Sxh. 3673, Doc.-Book 99--1, P* 53)*'
"Iho Runanian.wishos
and i'orava districts
information I romuirk
came the total ai-oa

for the incorporation of
are knc^vn hero* For yoir
that those wishes cannot
in question, Icnown under

the Timok, Kraina
pcrronal secret
be realiz^a, Ov
the iieiiie of Iron

Gate District, is, for economic reasons, later to oo placed und^r

German'protection as a special ad.dnistrativo unit. Rui^pmo-an
aspirations ref<-rring to this district rave as li
prospec
to be rboliz^d as alleged correspondLng Bulgarian ^;ishes^ . .. .
..s to the bostem Banat, Hungary has been c cnfidai^ally as
sured that it viill bo returned to her in its fiiLl extait in due

Oir spodal dmigns referring to the Iron Gate Disbri^ and

our promdso to Hungar-y concorning the ..ostm^n ^arat must ol
cour-se not become known to the RumardanGovemm^nb .

Like in "the foregoing aggressions, the defendant

.*OERI;alvl^ was very

inauential in shaping the most imp3tant details of the tbraign policy
of aggression, collaborating "ith "the State Secretary von i.-'-izsoockar and
advising the inexperiaicod Ribbentrop about tie best diplomatic techni
ques for aggrossivo acts.

-
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7, U.S.S.R.

The evidence "with re^rrd to the c-jj^^ression cgcinst Russic. eatcblishes thct b'OEHdiJm inplenented the policy of regression by various

diploriEtic nethods. Since :Irroh 1941 he v/c.s nv/tre thct rn eggression
f gainst Rusaic Yn:.s conteriplcted. On 2 Mrrch,l94l Ribbentrop sent a
telegrar.; to various foreign nissions abroad about nia conversation

v:ith the Japanese i.nbaasador Oshiria of 25 February 1941 (Ex.344, Itoc,
Book 3^ p.57). In this sealed natter telegrcn, on Tfhich '.roERLi/M is
checked on the aistrlbution list, Ribbentrop states the t in the spring

240 divisions, 186 of then first-class fighting divisions, vrould be
c.vailc.ble.

"i- war with Russia, £. Ithough not desired by us, Y/ould result

in a gigantic Geri.ian victory end v/ould r..or.n the ond of the

Soviet regiLie" (ibid.p.58).

Through Ribbentrop *^3 telegrrn of 9 Ilarch 1941 UOEflii-NiT learned that

Eimler planned to recruit about 1000 Finnish volunteers for the
SS Division "Viking" (Ex,345, Doc,Book 8^ p.62, u&SrdlWRi o?-i distribution
list).

On 15 blc.roh 1941 TKiEELIiiRT wr,s infornod that no iiore Russis n conxdssions would be tolerated after 25 March in East Prussia, since gitrong

contingents of Geraan troops v/ero csseribling in the IJorthern Sector, and
troop concantrc.tions would becono even stronger after 20 jicrch (Ex. 34S,
DOG,Book 83 p.l). DDERliil® thereupon requested oonfirr-rtion that there
were no such oorn-iisaions on Gernan soil including the Govorni..ent Gone"

ral vidthin the coripetenoe of Pol.V.

In ooraionting on this docui.;ont,

iVOERI'iidW states that he kne^v of atron.^ troop concontrctions already

from other sources, and that the whole world v:as talking about theu
(tr.p.11235/6).

On 16 ;pril 1941
transmitted to the Gerixn Snbassios in
MoacOTf £.iid Tokyo von Sohi.iieden' 4 report of 3 ipril 1941 ^.-orniiiij rer.inat
runor-nonserinG spread by Gerisn travellers in ^tissir, (Ex.349 , boo.
Book 83 p,8). The '^erucn J^i-.tcsstdor in Hoaoov.' answered
's letter
on 2 Itcy 1941 to the effect that these rurxrs wore supported by facts
(ibid. p.9), and liOEEJliia' states thrt he ^•£ s not astonished at all at
this answer since evoryone in Berlin opuld observe troop iaovoinonta to
-
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v.-

the Ecst (tr.p,11233),
UOEELILiril C.1S0 kno^v ct tho bo^^itinin^ of licy thrt oertriti Gcri'ic-n
Militc.ry iittochds ted, for o£Liouflrre recsons, received instructions
to use Ic.nguc.gG to the effect

"tte.t the nunber of Gerr.ic.n troops ct the "(western)" frontier
is limited to the extent cs is cbsolutely necessory for the

rec.r protection of Bc.lten oporrtions,"

(Ex,354, Doc.Book 8D p,26, tr.p.11233),
tYOERI'iUJIT further c.dnitted knov/lodgo of Ex.358, Doc.Book 83 p.33

(tr.p.11239) end Bx.332, Doc. Book 33 p.55 (tr ^p, 11244-). Ho is found on tho
distribution lists of Ex,342,355,363,364 in Doc,Book 83.

i

iibout 22Mry 1941, V/OEldifiiHT received the visit of Brr.outigcn, £ for-

•ner Doreign Office officifl, v/ho hrd been trcr.sferrod to the nov/ly
croc-tod Scst Ministry, Brceutigcn showed D'OERI.Ililll n series of :i£.ps,

preprred in Rosenborg's Er.st Ministry, v/hich outlined in dott il tho
intended politiof.l roorgf nisction of Russic. cfter the plnnned invc.sion.

i.ccording to Drceutigcn's tcstiuony, MGEH'JINN showed not surprise

(tr.pp.1019,1021). 1/0DRIU*N:T confirnod this tostiriony c.s correct
(tr.p,11240) end c.dnitst

"This visit, of course, wf.s t oonsidorc.blo confiri.jetion thc.t
• ;

WG must nov/ reckon on c wrr with Russic.. For cortc. in, of

course, I could not conclude c.nything, even fro:.^ tlfis fc.ot,"
(tr.p.ll243).
In spite of this knowledge, UGERIjlkNK, on 30 Muy 1941, stc.te^- to
the RuriC^nion Minis to r-

"I replied - cs I c.lv'oys do on such occc-aions -

thct it wc.s

ooiiiion Icnowledgc tht-t certi in Gorricn troop novonents in the
Sc.st hc.d tc.kon piece in connection with the'
Iken events
c.nd thc.t for the rest Gori.ic.n-Russicn relctions rer.ic.inod

coripletoly unohrngod,"

(Ex,359,Doc,Book 83 p.34, underlining supplied).
On tho eve of tho invcsion, on 21 June 1941,

-teizscockor forv/c.r-

dod to i/OERMAHN ^ibbcntrop's apoaic.l instructions for cnawoxing
questions in ccso tho

Russic n imbcsscdor should :ic.ko furthcsr inquiries

fbout c.n intorviow with Ribbontrop, The cnswor w£ s to bo thc'."t Ribbon-

trop's qffioo hcd no infori-ir.tion yot r.a to when Eibbontrop would be
beck} cs aoon cs he would bo bc.dk, tho Inbcescdor woqld bo inf*orriod.
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"•jOSPJ.I/iJN initiclod this doGf: :cut (E:c.3o5, Dog.13oo3': 3B p.62).
On 26 Juno 1941 "'./OEId.I/.lU t/c s inforriod by tho Hun^c-run ihvoy thc.t

c. strtG of T/c,r botwoon Hun^r.ry end Pus sic, v/culd only bo c. nnouncod c.fter

"•ungtry hc.d ccrriod out tho plc.nnod reprise Is of hor

i.ir Force

(Fx.369j Doc.Book 8^p.70)» These reprisals referred to en c.llegod
Russic.n C;ir rcid on Kosioo cbout which tho prosecution witness

/dnirc.l Horthy testified (tr .p»11248/9 ),

'•y

'

A

.:v:-

•'i •.

, '< .

- 64 -

•./v

. '.4'
. .

t

.

1

'-A
.•

.

VI.

s

main

D efens e

line

of

defense

his relations with Ribhentrop were
and that after

is

to

the

effect that

steadily deteriorating

several incidents Ribbentrop in fall

excluded TfOEHliAlTy

and

his

1958

Political Division from all

political decisions and restricted them to cure routine
work<

In the London period^ their relations were [ood, and

Ribbentrop treated him v;ith a certain respect (tr . p . 108 7 2) .
Ribbentrop also picked him for his position as Chief of the
Political Division (tr . p , 108 73) . However when taking ov-cr

his new position^ HGERJI/.l'N states he got a cool reception
from Ribbentrop (tr.p;10873j 11052). In July 1936, they
had a heated argument about a memorandum, which the British

Ambassador Sir ITeville Henderson passed through Lammers to

Hitler, thus by-passing Ribbentrop (-tr , n. li053/4) . The next
serious

quarrdl arose in November

HTOFRI-mrr contends,

I'^SB, when Ribbentrop,

cr i t i c is ed ITOERMAFF ^ s

as

attitude in Czech

affairs (tr .p.-11055). On the railroad trip from ]funic h t o

Vienna, Rib''^ antr op Informed him that in future the Fnlitical
Division v;ar, to be restricted to the handling of routine

matters (tr.p.11055/6) and "he adhered later to what he hed
said" (tr , p ^1105 6) . From that time on till 1943 , he had.
only five real discussions with Ribbentrop, and even those

mostly on sid.e issues or matters of minor Importance (ibid.)
In evaluating this defense, it must be kept in mind,
that, as the verbal evidence in this trial has brought to

light at numerous occasions, Ribbentrop v/as a psychopath who
was unable to restrain his temper, and, as an out s id er, had a
deep mistrust and inferiority complex against all career
officials of the Foreign Office and aspecial1v against those

among them., who were etrong personalities, like Veiz saecker

- 65 -

-rj.

ra.

ind Vi'CERL'AFF.
who

had

not

at

There via.L hardly an'""one in the !^oreign 0.f"^ice
some

time

conflict vjith Ribh entrop»

or

the

other

a

more

But ""'OTRFAFF' s

or

less

services

serious

to the

cause of Fasi diplomacy were so invaluable, that Hibhentrdp

overcame occasional spells of resentment and kept
s

as Chief of the Political Division up to a time long after

the last act of aggression had been completed.

-

' '^

I

66 —

• -.

I,.

T ' - n --"v'

•

Vlli

Conclusion.

The defendant WOER!'AhK participated substantially in all

aggressive acts beginning '^rith Czechoslovakia. He wais Chief
of the Political Division,

Foreign Office.

In this

the very heart

of the

German

position he necessarily rave intimate

and significant support to the acts of Ribbentrop and
"feissaecker .

From 1938 until 194S ijOERI^AFH suggested the policy most
suitable for the planning and initiating of aggressive wars.
He was the foreign policy expert in preparing the plans for

one aggression after the other. It is interesting to note
that Tj'OErrJAhlT and his Political Division furnished most of

the patterns for aggression v;hich v/ere later used, especially
in the attacks against C-z echos 1 o^'akia and Poland, The policy

influencing advices of'the expert .."CDR''i-Dr became the bluef

prints of th.e. diplomatic strategy of aggressions.
The eridenoe has established beyond a reasonable doubt
the guilt of the defendant "'/©ERri/VDH with respect to the
Charges

in Counts i

and II

of the Indictment.

